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INTRODUCTION 
 Policy attention to tax evasion and enforcement picked up after the financial crisis of 2008, the 
Great Recession, and the large deficits that followed. Particular attention on high-income 
individuals and corporations has accompanied heightened attention to income and wealth 
inequality. In the United States this momentum led to a major initiative aimed at reducing income 
tax evasion via unreported foreign accounts, albeit in the context of a shrinking IRS budget. In the 
United Kingdom, Chancellor Osborne announced an ongoing crackdown on tax avoidance, tax 
evasion, and “imbalances” in the tax system that would bring in £5 billion in additional revenue 
each year. 
 Academic research in tax evasion and enforcement has exploded in the new millennium, 
perhaps inspired by the renewed policy interest and certainly facilitated by increased academic 
access to administrative tax-return data and increased willingness of tax authorities to partner with 
researchers on randomized field trials that hold the promise of compelling identification of the 
impact of alternative enforcement strategies.  
 In this paper I review and discuss the policy implications of recent economic research on tax 
compliance and enforcement. This essay is not meant to be a comprehensive survey. Rather it 
emphasizes the new research since 2000, and reflects my own views about what are the most 
compelling research designs and issues.  It addresses mostly, but not only, income tax and focuses 
on issues related to individuals and small businesses. It does not touch on at all tax compliance of 
multinational companies, largely because the line between evasion and avoidance is especially 
blurry and the mechanisms of noncompliance are quite complicated, and does not discuss the 
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organization of tax administration.  Although the focus of the paper is fairly narrow, the methods 
and models it considers have wide application.   
I proceed as follows. Section 1 provides some background on the theory of tax evasion, both 
its positive and normative aspects. Section 2 discusses critically the research designs that can be 
used to learn about tax evasion and enforcement, with an emphasis on those that have achieved 
prominence recently. Section 3 examines what we have learned over the past 15 years or so, and 
Section 4 draws out the implications for U.S. policy of this research and of policies in place in 
other countries.  Section 5 concludes by predicting (or fantasizing about?) how tax evasion and 
enforcement will figure in the President’s State of the Union Address of 2017. 
1. The Economics of Tax Evasion 
 Discussion of tax administration, compliance, and enforcement fits naturally into what 
Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014) call a “tax-systems” framework. A tax system is defined as a set of 
rules, regulations, and procedures with three aspects.  First, it defines what events or states of the 
world trigger tax liability, for example the earning of income, the ownership of a residence that 
might be subject to property tax, or the sale of a capital asset. Although this first aspect, tax bases 
and rates, is the principal object of modern tax analysis, it’s only one part.  Second, a tax system 
specifies who or what entity must remit that tax and when, which we might call remittance rules.  
For example, under most income tax systems, it is the employer that remits—actually sends to the 
government—an approximation of what tax their employees owe on that income.  Third and 
finally, a tax system details procedures for ensuring compliance, including the provision of third-
party information-reporting requirements and the consequences, including penalties, of not 
remitting legal liability: these are the enforcement rules.  This essay focuses on the third aspect of 
a tax system, but clearly there is substantial overlap among the three issues: for example, the tax 
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base and the remittance system can have a profound effect on the enforceability of taxation. 
1.1 Why Tax Evasion Matters 
 Tax evasion is an important issue because it affects the distribution of the tax burden as well 
as the resource cost of raising taxes—bread-and-butter concerns of public economics. If the tax 
gap could somehow be costlessly eliminated and the true liability remitted, the additional money 
collected could be used to finance worthy government projects, or used to finance an across-the-
board cut in tax rates that would benefit most compliant taxpayers. But expanding government 
programs could be financed in a number of other ways, such as by raising tax rates or by 
broadening the income tax base, and a tax reduction could be financed by cuts in overall spending. 
The real question is whether curbing evasion would improve the equity and efficiency implications 
of the public finances.  
 If opportunities or predilections for evasion were systematically related to income, as shown 
by Johns and Slemrod (2010), then the tax rate schedule could just be adjusted to achieve whatever 
degree of progressivity is deemed optimal. Of course, not everyone evades taxes by the same 
proportionate amount or by an amount strictly related to income, both because of differences in 
personal characteristics—like attitudes toward risk, the tax system, and honesty— and because of 
different opportunities and potential rewards for evasion. Evasion creates horizontal inequity 
because, unintendedly, equally well-off people end up with different tax burdens. Attempts to 
reduce tax evasion can raise vertical equity concerns, as when the IRS is criticized for spending 
resources to reduce fraud related to the Earned Income Tax Credit, whose recipients are low-
income households, instead of devoting those enforcement resources to the types of 
noncompliance more likely to be pursued by high-income households, such as the use of 
unreported foreign accounts.  
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 Tax evasion also imposes efficiency costs. The most obvious are the resources taxpayers 
expend to implement and camouflage noncompliance, that third parties incur to implement 
withholding and provide information reports, and the resources the tax authority uses to address 
noncompliance. In addition, tax evasion generally provides a socially inefficient incentive to 
engage in those activities for which it is relatively easy to evade taxes. For example, because the 
income from house painting can be done on a cash basis and is therefore harder for the IRS to 
detect, this occupation is more attractive than otherwise. Although a supply of eager and cheap 
housepainters undoubtedly is greeted warmly by prospective buyers of that service, the effort of 
the extra people drawn to house painting, or any activity that facilitates tax evasion, would have 
higher social value in some alternative occupation. The same argument applies to self-employment 
generally, as the enhanced opportunity for noncompliance inefficiently attracts people who would 
otherwise be employees. The opportunity for noncompliance can distort resource allocation in a 
variety of other ways, such as causing companies that otherwise would not find it attractive to set 
up a financial subsidiary, or set up operations in a tax haven, to facilitate or camouflage evasion.  
 A tax incidence story also lurks here. The supply of eager housepainters bids down the market 
price of a house-painting job. Thus, the amount of taxes evaded overstates the benefit of being a 
tax-evading housepainter. The biggest loser in this game is the scrupulously honest (or risk-averse) 
housepainter, who sees his or her wages bid down by the unscrupulous competition, but who 
dutifully complies. Those who purchase house-painting services and don’t mind paying cash will 
benefit as well.  
 The recognition of tax evasion focuses our attention on the set of enforcement policy 
instruments, the appropriate setting of which can be illuminated by optimal tax reasoning and 
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fleshed out with empirical analysis. For instance, what should be the extent of audit coverage, the 
strategy for choosing audit targets, and the penalty imposed on detected evasion? 
 Curtailing tax evasion is not costless, and its costs must be considered in developing optimal 
policy. The mere presence of tax evasion does not imply a failure of policy. Just as it is not optimal 
to station a police officer at each street corner to eliminate robbery and jaywalking completely, it 
is not optimal to completely eliminate tax evasion.  
 Just how many resources should be devoted to enforcing the tax laws? Slemrod and Yitzhaki 
(1987) show that one superficially intuitive rule—increase the probability of detection until the 
marginal increase of revenue thus generated equals the marginal resource cost of so doing—is 
incorrect. Although the cost of hiring more auditors, buying better computers, and the like, is a 
true resource cost, the revenue brought in does not represent a net gain to the economy, but rather 
a transfer from private (noncompliant) citizens to the government. The correct rule equates the 
marginal social benefit of reduced evasion (which is not well measured by the increased revenue) 
to the marginal resource cost. The social benefit includes the reduced risk-bearing that comes with 
reduced tax evasion, and any reduction in the inefficiencies discussed earlier. Cowell (1990, p. 
136) suggests another complication: perhaps a specific social welfare discount should apply to the 
utility of those who are found to be guilty of tax evasion and thus “are known to be antisocial.” 
 As Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014) have elaborated, optimal tax theory can be naturally extended 
to cover enforcement policy instruments. Ignoring distributional concerns, these tools reveal that 
all tax policy instruments—not just the standard instruments such as tax rates—should be utilized 
so as to equalize the marginal efficiency cost per dollar of revenue raised, which should in turn 
equal the marginal social benefit of raising revenue (Mayshar, 1991; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 1996, 
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2002). Distributional considerations can be introduced into this framework in a straightforward 
way.   
1.2 The Evasion Decision  
 Why would an individual or business evade taxes? To an economist, the natural starting point 
is to consider the private costs and benefits of evasion. And indeed the standard framework for 
considering whether and how much to evade taxes is a deterrence model. This was first formulated 
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), who adapted Becker’s (1968) model of criminal behavior to 
the economics of tax evasion. In this model, a risk-averse taxpayer decides whether and how much 
to evade taxes in the same way she would approach any risky decision or gamble. People are 
influenced by possible legal penalties no differently than any other contingent cost: there is nothing 
per se about the illegality of tax evasion that matters. Nor is there any intrinsic willingness to meet 
one’s tax obligations, sometimes referred to as “tax morale.” The model predicts that an increase 
in either the probability of detection or the penalty if detected will reduce evasion, but does not 
pin down how big these effects are, so it becomes the task of empirical analysis. The effect of a 
change in the marginal tax rate is less clear, and depends on the form of the penalty function, as 
shown by Yitzhaki (1974).  
 Subsequent research has enriched this model on a number of dimensions.  One important 
extension is to allow the probability of detection to vary by the type of evasion contemplated. For 
example, in most countries, because of employer information reporting the probability of detection 
is close to one for unreported employee income. It is generally much lower, but increasing with 
the magnitude, for underreported self-employment income. For someone with multiple sources of 
income, the probability of detection would rise with the total amount of income evaded as one first 
underreports those sources with the lowest probability, and then moves on to underreport those 
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types of income with higher probability. This discussion suggests that more attention should be 
paid to what might be called the technology of tax evasion. 
1.3 The Informal Economy 
 A related but distinct concept to evasion is the informal economy, also known as the 
underground, hidden, or black economy. Many definitions of the informal economy have been 
suggested, having in common the notion of small-scale economic activities that are unobserved by 
official authorities. The informal economy includes small firms that don’t register with the relevant 
tax or labor regulation authorities, employees who are not on the payroll, freelancers who don’t 
file tax returns, and so on. Many evasion activities are clearly outside of its scope, such as 
overstating deductible charitable contributions or setting up a foreign bank account and not 
reporting the taxable income it generates. Not all informal enterprises are evading, say, income 
taxes, as their income may be legitimately below the filing threshold while ignoring labor and 
safety regulations. Whether illegal activities should be included in the informal economy is 
controversial; if they were, we would have to acknowledge that not all such operations are small, 
as witnessed by narcotrafficking.  
 In situations where labor income in the formal sector is routinely reported by the employer to 
the tax enforcement agency, the only way to evade tax may be by “moonlighting”—working extra 
hours for oneself at a different job—or by switching completely to the informal sector. The 
standard deterrence model can be easily modified to address the choice between formal- and 
informal-sector work by supposing that the taxpayer receives a higher pre-tax wage rate for formal-
sector work but the income is taxed at the statutory rate and cannot be evaded, while informal-
sector income is untaxed unless detected by a random audit.  
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 There is certainly evidence that evasion is concentrated in particular sectors, such as those that 
supply services directly to homeowners, because of the small scale of production that can aid 
concealment and the lesser need for receipts compared to services provided to businesses. Erard 
and Ho (2003) find that compliance is positively associated with the degree of third-party reporting 
and negatively associated with the filing burden for a given occupation.  Measured as a percentage 
of tax unpaid, the occupations with the most noncompliance are vehicle dealers, tip earners, 
informal suppliers, and other service occupations.  
 The standard deterrence framework applies naturally to tax compliance decisions made by 
individuals and small, single-owner businesses, but the applicability to big business is less clear. 
Arguably, large public companies should act as if they are risk-neutral, rather than like the risk-
averse decision makers in the standard model. If this is true, one must look elsewhere for what 
constrains positive-expected-value evasion. Some firms might be concerned that publicized tax 
aggressiveness turns off some potential customers who would prefer to deal with civic-minded 
companies.  On the other hand, some investors might take tax aggressiveness as a signal that a 
company is optimally aggressive both in its dealings with the tax authority but also with suppliers 
and customers (but not with investors themselves!).1  
1.4 Non-deterrence Considerations 
 Some social scientists have argued that the deterrence framework misses important elements 
of the tax evasion decision, and question some of its central assumptions, including that (1) nothing 
per se about the illegality of evasion matters, and (2) everyone acts as a free rider, so that there is 
no issue of intrinsic willingness to pay, or “tax morale.” Some have gone further to suggest that, 
in thinking about tax evasion, it is necessary to abandon the standard expected utility maximization 
model and incorporate “behavioral” considerations.   
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 The models that abandon one or both of these assumptions take different tacks. One approach 
stresses that some people may fully comply with their legal obligation because of a sense of civic 
duty regardless of, or in addition to, the possible expected pecuniary gains and argue that the 
tendency to perform one’s duty is susceptible to aspects of the enforcement process. Indeed, Frey 
(1997) argues that imposing more punitive enforcement policies may crowd out the “intrinsic” 
motivation to comply by making people feel that they pay taxes because they have to, rather than 
because they want to. 
 Another approach suggests that, rather than behaving as free riders, some individuals’ behavior 
depends on the process by which the tax and tax enforcement system are formulated and its 
features, holding constant the incentives the system provides. For example, they may be more 
willing to comply with a system whose formulation they had a part in through voting; compliance 
may be lowered by the imposition of an unpopular program, as investigated in a lab-experiment 
setting by Alm et al. (1992). 
 Taxpayer attitudes toward authority may also influence compliance behavior. Tyler (2006) 
argues that citizens are more likely to be law-abiding if they view legal authorities as legitimate, 
and the degree of legitimacy may itself be a function of the level of enforcement. When explicit 
enforcement is weak (e.g., few audits), legitimacy may erode, undermining the intrinsic 
willingness of taxpayers to comply with the law. People may be willing to comply with a law 
because they perceive it to be just, quite aside from their beliefs regarding the authority government 
has to enforce it. Such individual judgments can be complex; for example, expenditures on warfare 
might contribute to a sense of fairness tolerated in a patriotic period, but rejected during another 
period characterized by antimilitarism. Levi (1989) stresses the role of “reciprocal altruism,” in 
which some taxpayers’ behavior depends on the behavior, motivations, and intentions not of any 
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subset of particular individuals, but of the government itself: when citizens believe that the 
government will act in their interests, that its procedures are fair, and that their trust of the state 
and others is reciprocated, then people are more likely to become “contingent consenters” who 
cooperate in paying taxes even when their short-term material interest would make free riding the 
individual’s best option.  
 Much of the evidence related to these nonstandard behaviors comes from how people react to 
other people, as in lab experiments. But the psychological attitudes of individuals toward 
government might be fundamentally different than their attitudes toward other people, or even 
other organizations. Individuals might feel more dutiful and even obedient toward government. 
Invocation of the word obedience, though, invokes a darker side of the relationship between 
individuals and government as an authority figure. Indeed, notorious experiments conducted by 
the Yale University psychologist Stanley Milgram (1963), showed that unwitting subjects were 
willing to deliver what they thought were substantial electric shocks when instructed to, and 
encouraged to, by authority figures.   
2. METHODOLOGY—HOW HAVE WE LEARNED NEW THINGS? 
The empirical analysis of evasion is highly challenging due, fairly obviously, to tax evaders’ 
concealment activities. The threat of punishment and perhaps social shame make taxpayers 
unwilling to respond accurately even to surveys. Many years ago a colleague of mine remarked at 
an academic conference, sarcastically but somewhat accurately, that the empirical analysis of tax 
evasion is very straightforward, except for two things: (1) you can’t measure the right-hand-side 
variables, and (2) you can’t measure the left-hand-side variable.  Almost all the empirical analyses 
of evasion, including the most credible ones, don’t actually have a reliable measure of evasion, but 
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instead rely on indirect measures of evasion.  Tax administrations have the same problem: it’s not 
easy to measure evasion.  
 But scholars have risen to the challenge, and there are several promising developments in 
measuring tax evasion and, more importantly, measuring the determinants of tax evasion and how 
different policies might affect tax evasion. I discuss these developments next. 
2.1 Random Audits 
 The IRS National Research Program (NRP)2 provides a snapshot of compliance and evasion 
from a stratified random sample of approximately 46,000 returns. In the NRP, experienced auditors 
manually review each return and decide on one of three possible courses of action:  accept the 
return as corroborated by third-party information, write to the taxpayer for additional information 
on up to three items that could not be corroborated, or conduct an in-person audit. The NRP 
oversamples returns from high-income taxpayers and individuals who report (Schedule C) sole 
proprietorship income. Because the line-by-line audits can fail to uncover substantial amounts of 
noncompliance, the tax gap estimates based on NRP studies make significant adjustments for 
undetected noncompliance that rely on special studies of particular sources of income and 
deductions. For several categories of income, a multiplier is constructed and applied to the detected 
but unreported income to generate an estimate of the total amount that should have been reported—
covering both the portion detected and the portion undetected by the examiner.3 Analyses of the 
National Research Program data form the basis for the individual income tax underreporting gap.  
 Given the scale of the program required (and perhaps its political sensitivity), tax authorities 
in very few countries have done such studies,4 and so it is impossible to draw inferences from 
cross-country studies of this nature. Even for the United States, where these studies were done 
regularly for many years, it is difficult to draw inferences about changes in noncompliance over 
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time, because the methodologies used have varied. The limited usefulness of these estimates for 
these purposes is not really a surprise, because the main objective of the TCMP/NRP is not to 
come up with aggregate “tax gap” measures of the magnitude of evasion or of the nature of evasion, 
but rather to help identify returns that are more likely to feature evasion, so as to guide the 
allocation of enforcement resources.  
2.2 Randomized Field Experiments 
 Randomized field experiments have been heralded as being in the vanguard of the “credibility 
revolution” (Angrist and Pischke, 2010) in empirical economics because they facilitate 
identification of the causal impact of, for example, a policy intervention. When implemented 
appropriately, the researcher need not worry about getting a control group, because the control 
group is built into the randomization; there are two otherwise statistically identical groups, one 
that gets the policy treatment of interest and the other that doesn’t.  Although tax rates and bases 
are unlikely to be randomized in the field, for other tax-system instruments policy randomization 
is possible and, more important, has become a reality. The researcher must overcome tax 
authorities’ understandable reluctance to randomize tax rates or bases, so that randomized tax 
experiments have heretofore mostly concerned tax-system instruments such as communication 
with taxpayers. 
 Note that in some cases randomization might be naturally generated, rather than consciously 
introduced in order to learn about the impact of alternative policies. Think of, for example, the use 
of the Vietnam-era draft lottery number as a randomly assigned risk of induction, as in Angrist 
(1990), to estimate the effect of veteran status on civilians earnings. Closer to the topic at hand is 
the study of Dobbie and Song (2014), who exploit the fact that U.S. bankruptcy courts use a blind 
rotation system to assign cases to judges who are of measurable heterogeneous “toughness” in 
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order to study the impact of bankruptcy protection on debtor outcomes. If, in some situations, tax 
auditors are randomly or quasi-randomly assigned to cases, one might be able to learn about the 
impact on behavior of auditor toughness. 
 Despite the unrivaled internal validity of well-designed randomized control trials, it is not 
always clear that the results can be “scaled up.” General equilibrium effects may matter, and 
without understanding the causal channels through which policy interventions affect taxpayers’ 
behavior, it may not be possible to predict the effect of variations in the policy intervention without 
running repeated experiments. In addition some interventions that are credible in an experimental 
setting may not be credible in an economy-wide setting. For example, Kleven et al. (2011) sent 
treatment groups 50 percent probability and 100 percent probability audit threat letters; savvy  
taxpayers would know that either policy is prohibitively expensive were either of these treatments 
to be expanded to the entire population.  
2.3 Wider Availability of Administrative Data 
 A very promising recent development is the wider availability for analysis of administrative 
tax-return data, sometimes linked to other administrative records, often on the whole population 
of a country.  These kinds of data first became available in Nordic countries, but now they’re 
available under varying protocols in Canada, in the United Kingdom, many other European 
countries, and the United States (here explicitly not generally linked to other administrative data).  
Compared to having small samples of tax-return data, when a researcher has all returns, she has 
much more (statistical) power to reach reliable conclusions about the effect of taxation and to 
investigate such issues as the heterogeneity among groups defined by geography or other 
demographic variables. The fact that tax-return data generally contain what the taxpayer reported, 
15 
 
rather than the “truth,” is a particular advantage when studying the elasticity of taxable income, 
which crucially includes evasion and avoidance responses to tax policy instruments. 
2.4 Analysis of Archival Data, with Kinks, Notches, and Regression Discontinuity Research 
Designs 
 Empirical analysis outside of the randomized control paradigm is by no means dead, nor should 
it be, especially when making use of tax-return administrative data. But the bar for credible 
identification strategies in archival research (and randomized field experiments) has gotten higher. 
The credibility revolution in empirical economics I referred to earlier aspires to overthrow poorly 
identified causal interpretations and casual use of instrumental variables, and to instill a skepticism 
regarding inference based on cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data for which one can 
plausibly argue that unobserved influences do not change over time.  
 Two research designs other than randomized controlled trials hold particular promise and have 
been widely exploited recently in empirical tax analyses: regression discontinuity and analysis of 
kinks and notches in policy. In a regression discontinuity design, there is a cutoff or threshold 
above or below which a treatment is assigned.  By comparing observations lying closely on either 
side of the threshold and therefore arguably quite similar, one can estimate the average effect of 
the treatment in that local area of the threshold, even in environments where randomization is not 
feasible.  Note that it is crucial that the assignment of people to treatment is random, and that it is 
impossible for the people to manipulate their treatment status.  
 When policy introduces kinks in budget sets, so that the marginal tax rate changes 
discontinuously around the kink, this offers the hope of identification because arguably in many 
cases the people on either side of the kink are on average fairly similar. How many people “bunch” 
at the kink provides, under some assumptions, a measure of how elastic choices are on average 
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with respect to the tax rate. Even more potentially powerful is the analysis of behavior in the 
presence of policy-induced notches, where the budget set itself is discontinuous, so for example 
reporting one additional dollar of income increases one’s tax liability by a few hundred dollars. 
Ever since their potential for identification was understood, a surprisingly high number of policy 
notches have been discovered and analyzed.  What makes the study of notches particularly 
promising is that their presence implies that there is some region of behavior that is always 
dominated by another region, regardless of one’s preferences (utility functions): earning one less 
dollar to get below the kind of notch just mentioned saves money and requires less labor, a win-
win for the majority (all non-academics?) of folks who prefer more leisure to less. The fact that in 
all cases so far examined there are some people residing in the dominated region sheds light on 
the constellation of reasons that might apply: irrationality, cluelessness, adjustment costs, and so 
on.5    
2.5 Traces of True Income and Evasion with Micro Data 
 In a traces-of-income approach, one identifies an indicator of the true tax base, say income, 
and compares that to reported income. The classic research design is due to Pissarides and Weber 
(1989), who use food consumption as an income indicator.  They assume reasonably that how 
much food someone purchases is a function of income, but doesn’t depend on what kind of 
income—salary versus self-employment—a person has.  Next they look at what the ratio of food 
purchases to reported income is, separately for employees and self-employed people. Thus, they 
infer (relative) income from food, and compare this “trace” of true income to (relative) reported 
income. Under a traces-of-evasion approach, one looks for behavior that can reasonably only be 
explained by tax evasion, for example the hoarding of high-value currency. This approach is 
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related to the broader topic of “anomaly detection,” used to assist, for example, in the detection of 
credit-card fraud, as discussed in Chandola et al. (2009). 
2.6 Lab Experiments 
 Lab experiments provide a way to evaluate a wide range of policy interventions and to control 
the environment very precisely, but suffer from the drawback that subjects—usually students—
may not respond in the same way in the lab as they, or a more representative sample of taxpayers, 
would if the same interventions were implemented in reality, in part because in reality most 
taxpayers bring vast experience and subtle perceptions of the tax system. 
 Defenders of lab experiments argue that there is no reason that the cognitive processes of 
students should differ from adults. Alm et al. (2013) compare the behavior of a group of 
undergraduate students to adults who participate in the same lab experiment. Participants 
performed a real task to generate income, filed a “tax return,” got audited with some probability, 
and paid penalties. They find that, on average, the adults were more compliant than students, but 
that the effect of the treatment (provision of tax information services and benefits) was similar 
across the two groups.   However, another recent study casts some doubt on this argument. Choo 
et al. (2014) conduct a similar experiment separately with a sample of undergraduates in the United 
Kingdom who had never been subject to income taxes, and a sample of taxpayers comprised of 
both employees and self-assessed taxpayers whose income outside the experiment is not subject 
to third-party reporting. Contrary to what Alm et al. (2013) find, the students behaved differently 
from the taxpayer samples. They were more sensitive to uncertainty about the probability of audit 
and were much more likely to comply when the audit probability was unknown. The authors 
suggest that norms of compliance formed in the real world are carried into the experiment, which 
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imposes limits on how much lab experiments with student samples can tell us about taxpayer 
behavior in the field.  
 Lab experiments can be useful in testing the impact on tax compliance of aspects of the 
environment that are not easy to analyze in field and natural experiment settings, such as tax rates 
and other potential factors. While one cannot, in a field experiment, experimentally manipulate 
environmental aspects such as deep-seated trust in government, neither can a lab experiment.  
2.7 Cross-Country, Top-Down Approaches 
 A large literature has analyzed traces of true income to shed light on the size of the informal 
economy across countries. For example, conditional on other determinants a high ratio of 
aggregate electricity use to formal income might indicate a relatively large informal sector, just as 
a high ratio of household expenditure on food or charitable giving to reported income might 
indicate relatively high underreporting of true income. One might consider proceeding in the same 
manner as Pissarides and Weber (1989) but using country-level rather than individual data, but 
there is one critical caveat. In the Pissarides-Weber approach, there is a counterfactual (by 
assumption)—employees do not misreport their income—and comparing the food-reported 
income of employees and self-employed people then reveals information about income 
underreporting. Having only country data on reported income and a measure of true electricity use 
reveals patterns and levels of underreporting only by making very strong, and often untestable, 
assumptions about the relationship between electricity use and true national income.  
 A macro version of the traces-of-evasion approach has focused on what can be learned from 
demand for currency, based on the plausible argument that $1,000 bills are of particular value to 
launder illegal transactions or evade regulations. Feige (1990) estimates the size of the 
underground economy by assuming that most unreported economic activity takes place in cash, 
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and that there is a “base year” when the underground economy did not exist. Similarly, Tanzi 
(1980, 1983) interprets the portion of the ratio of currency to money more broadly defined 
explained by changes in the tax level as an indication of changes in the size of the underground 
economy. The most complex empirical approach to measuring the informal economy and its 
determinants at a country level makes use of information about traces of true income, traces of 
noncompliance, and measures of official GDP, using a latent variable approach, also known as 
MIMIC (multiple-indicators, multiple-causes) modeling. As detailed in Slemrod and Weber 
(2012), the estimates of the informal economy that come from such studies are problematic to 
interpret.  
 A more promising aggregate approach would make use of the voluminous country-level data 
on tax administration now regularly made available in OECD information reports. The latest 
edition, OECD (2015), covers all the OECD countries plus 22 others, and contains scores of tables 
with data on institutional arrangements, organization, resources, measures of operational 
performance, the use of online services, withholding regimes, the use of third-party information 
reporting, penalties, and the like, plus literally hundreds of changes in these details by country. 
Cross-country analysis of the consequences of administration and enforcement changes would be 
subject to the standard concerns about bias from unmeasured country influences, but we are now 
to the point where longitudinal analysis is possible, as the first such report was issued in 2004. Not 
“deterred” by this concern, Robinson and Slemrod (2012) used these data to analyze 10 non-rate 
tax-system aspects and found that cross-country variation in tax administration can help explain 
the causal underpinning of the enduring—and troubling to some—positive cross-country 
correlation between tax levels and per capita income: adding a measure of the number of tax 
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authority employees can eliminate the otherwise significant positive estimated coefficient of GDP 
per capita on the tax level, and attracts a significant positive correlation itself. 
3. WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 
 I will begin by focusing on the deterrence model, and then address non-deterrence explanations 
of tax compliance. The two key parameters of the deterrence model are the probability that an act 
of evasion will be detected, and the penalty one receives upon detection--its severity, nature, and 
celerity. Of interest to policy is the extent of the reaction of compliance to changes in the 
probability of detection and the most efficient ways to achieve a given vector of detection 
probabilities that apply to types of evasion. 
3.1 The Magnitude and Nature of Evasion 
 The IRS most recently updated their estimates in 2012, based on 2006 returns. The overall 
gross tax gap is estimated as $450 billion, which amounts to 16.9 percent of the estimated actual 
(paid plus unpaid) tax liability; the IRS calls the 83.1 percent that is remitted the “voluntary 
compliance rate.”6 The IRS expects to eventually collect $65 billion of the $450 billion gross tax 
gap estimate, which results in a “net tax gap” of $385 billion. In other words, 14.5 percent of the 
estimated tax liability will never be paid. The noncompliance rate varies widely by the source of 
information reporting to the IRS. When there is little to no third-party-reported information (such 
as self-employment income), the noncompliance rate is as high as 56 percent. It is 11 percent 
when there is “some” reporting, 8 percent when there is “substantial” information reporting and 
as low as 1 percent when there is both withholding and substantial reporting (such as wages and 
salaries). Small businesses represent a large portion of the tax gap in individual income; 
approximately 52 percent of underreporting of individual income tax comes from business 
income.7  The wide divergence between the compliance rates of employees and the self-
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employed has attracted a lot of research interest and has focused attention on the latter group. 
Recall that Pissarides and Weber (1989) pioneered the “traces-of-income” approach using U.K. 
Family Expenditure Survey data on food consumption to estimate the extent of evasion, 
assuming that (1) only the self-employed evade, and (2) that the relationship between food 
consumption and true income is independent of employment status. With these assumptions, they 
are able to predict true income—and therefore underreporting—for the self-employed survey 
respondents. Assuming income reports in the survey match those given to the tax authority, they 
estimate that self-employed people in the United Kingdom on average underreported their 
income by about one-third.8 The survey measures income as reported by individuals.  
 Feldman and Slemrod (2007) follow a similar approach, but avoid the need to use survey 
data by instead using as the trace of evasion charitable donations reported on income tax returns 
relative to reported income. They find that, other things equal, reported positive self-employment 
income of $1 is associated with the same level of contributions as $1.54 of wage and salary 
income, which implies—assuming a negligible wage and salary noncompliance rate and that the 
self- employed are not inherently more charitable than others—a self-employment 
noncompliance rate of 35 percent (0.54/1.54), very similar to the Pissarides-Weber estimate but 
below the NRP figure; for positive farm net income, the implied noncompliance rate is 74 
percent. Intriguingly, negative reported values for self-employment income are also associated 
with more contributions than reported by taxpayers with no self-employment income, suggesting 
that on average these reported losses are associated with higher true incomes. Relative to the 
Pissarides-Weber tradition, two aspects of this study are particularly worthy of note, one good 
and one not so good. It’s good that the method does not require the researcher to classify a 
taxpayer as either an employee or self-employed. It’s not so good that the key assumption, that 
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the conditional charity-income ratio does not vary by employment status, is stronger than the 
equivalent assumption about food; for example, Glazer and Konrad (1996) argue that some 
people give to charities to signal wealth (or integrity), a motive that is arguably more relevant for 
self-employed people. 
 Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) employed a similar approach to estimate the effect of Russia’s 
2001 flat tax reform on the extent of evasion. Using household panel data containing reports on 
consumption, income, and a range of household characteristics, they estimate an observed 
consumption–income gap function (as a trace of evasion) for each household, and then use a 
difference-in-difference technique to estimate the effect of the tax reform on the consumption–
income gap. Their treatment group consists of high-income households experiencing a relatively 
large decline in marginal tax rates. They find that the consumption–income gap fell by about 10 
percent more for the treatment group than for the control group. Assuming that the true relative 
consumption-income gap did not change over this period, one can interpret this finding as 
indicating a relative increase in reported income by those whose tax rate declined. Notably, the 
consumption–income gap fell by about 17 percent for the control group despite no change in 
marginal tax rates, suggesting an improvement in tax enforcement practices accompanying the 
change in tax rates, although the authors found no clear evidence that the decline was due to 
changes in tax administration.  
 Cabral et al. (2014) employ a similar methodology to measure evasion among the self-
employed in the United Kingdom. They find a similar pattern of underreporting; assuming that 
salaried workers report truthfully, self-employed workers’ true income is on average 28 percent 
higher than what they report. They also identify characteristics of individuals that are correlated 
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with underreporting and find that older individuals, white-collar workers, and women are more 
likely to be compliant.  
 Some of the underlying assumptions of this class of analyses have recently been re-examined.  For example, in this 
class of analyses income reports in household surveys have usually been treated as free of systematic 
misreporting, largely because underreporting income on a survey does not change tax liability. 
However, Hurst et al. (2014) argue that the benefit to a noncompliant individual household of 
reporting accurately in a survey setting is so small that even a slight probability that their report is not 
confidential could result in underreporting. Using a Pissarides-Weber-style methodology, they 
estimate that the self-employed underreport income in both the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey 
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics by about 30 percent. This finding suggests that evidence 
on traces of evasion from survey data can be informative just as what one finds in tax returns, as 
taxpayer reporting behavior may be similar in both settings.   
 All of these studies have specifically addressed the behavior of self-employed individuals 
relative to employees who are assumed cannot or do not underreport their tax liability. The 
incentive for the self-employed to evade over and above that of employees is clear, as their income 
is not subject to third-party reporting and it is more costly for them to accurately account for their 
income. The papers vary in their definition of a “self-employed” individual. Pissarides and Weber 
(1989) treat anyone as self-employed who reports more than 25 percent of their income as due to 
self-employment. Other research, such as Cabral et al. (2014), uses taxpayers’ own categorizations 
of themselves as self-employed.  
 Some recent research has questioned the assumption that employees do not evade. This could 
be particularly relevant for studies that do not identify taxpayers as self-employed by their source 
of income, because the main channel of underreporting for employees would be undeclared self-
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employment income.  Individuals who might be full-time or part-time employees of a firm may 
also hold other jobs or perform freelance work. They may identify as employees in a household 
survey, but also receive income from self-employment. If they fail to report this additional income, 
studies that assume no evasion among “employed” workers would underestimate evasion by those 
identified as “self-employed.”  Dunbar and Fu (2015) examine this issue using data from the 
Canadian Survey of Financial Security and the Survey of Household Spending to estimate the 
incidence and extent of income underreporting in Canada in 1998 and 2004. They find evidence 
that income underreporting is pervasive, and is not confined only to households that report some 
self-employment income in the survey data; the underreported income might not be wages and 
salaries, though.  
 In the context of private-sector employees in Estonia, Paulus (2015) also finds that employees 
underreport salary income. Using a dataset that links information from tax forms to a more 
comprehensive household survey, he estimates the extent of underreporting of income by 
employees whose income is subject to third-party reporting, arguing that both the employee and 
the employer have an incentive to coordinate and underreport income: the employer gains from 
owing lower payroll taxes and can also credibly lower reported revenue to save on the VAT. 
Making the slightly less restrictive assumption that (only) public-sector employees must (and do) 
report truthfully, he uses the correlation between income information in survey data and 
administrative data for these employees as a benchmark to compare to private-sector employees. 
He estimates that about 20 percent of private-sector employees in Estonia underreport income.  
 Best (2014) studies matched tax administrative data on firms and salaried workers in Pakistan 
to examine the role of firms in determining how workers’ taxable earnings respond to taxation, as 
stressed by Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006). Two findings are of particular interest. First, like Paulus 
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(2015), he documents misreporting of salaries, with 19 percent of workers misreporting. Second, 
firms aggregate the preferences of workers and facilitate tax avoidance by bunching their salary 
offers around kinks in the tax schedule. 
 Artavanis et al. (2012) employ a clever research design that takes advantage of household 
microdata from one of ten large banks in Greece to estimate the extent of underreported income 
for self-employed Greek workers by type of occupation. They rely on the fact that financial-sector 
formalization coexists with widespread underreporting of income, and note that southern European 
banks have had to become skilled at inferring true income from reported income in order to remain 
competitive. Using this insight, and assuming that income is accurately reported for wage and 
salary earners, they estimate a credit supply equation for wage earners using reported income, hard 
information (such as credit history, borrower characteristics), and soft information (such as local 
economic growth) available to the bank. Supposing this credit supply equation to be valid for wage 
earners, they infer the “multipliers” that the bank implicitly applies to reported self-employment 
income. They estimate multipliers in excess of two for doctors, lawyers, engineers and scientists, 
and accountants and financial service agents, indicating that for these professions reported income 
is less than half of true income as inferred by the bank. They note that even this may be an 
underestimate if the bank applies a discount for any additional income or collection risk assessed, 
or if the credit supply equation is biased because a multiplier is also applied to wage earners’ 
reported income because of suspected employee evasion. 
 These studies consistently show that evasion is substantially higher for income that is not 
subject to third-party reporting. The level of evasion, however, is more difficult to pin down. We 
can consider estimates from studies like Pissarides and Weber (1989), Cabral et al. (2014), and 
Feldman and Slemrod (2007) as a lower bound of evasion by the self-employed. As Dunbar and 
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Fu (2015) suggest, their crucial assumption that employees do not underreport may not always 
hold: individuals identified as “employees” in survey data underreport income earned outside of 
their primary job. Studies that estimate evasion by source of income instead of the employment 
status of the worker can come closer to a true estimate of the level of evasion. However, as Paulus 
(2015) finds, in some situations in some countries employees may underreport the portion of their 
income that is subject to third-party reporting. Looking for traces of evasion using data sources 
other than tax returns appears to be a fruitful way to detect underreporting. As Artavanis et al. 
(2012) show, this approach can be applied in creative settings and provides a tool to measure 
evasion in areas where it may be difficult or impossible to detect through a random audit like the 
NRP.    
3.2 Deterrence 
3.2.1 Audits 
 As already mentioned, one of the stimulants to the wave of recent empirical research in tax 
compliance has been the willingness of some tax authorities to partner with researchers to design 
and implement randomized controlled trials to learn about aspects of tax enforcement. (No 
authority has yet shown willingness to randomize tax rates outside of the context of income support 
programs, bases, or tax remittance regimes.) The most prominent example is threat-of-audit letters, 
which I discuss next.9 
 In the first application to tax compliance of an RCT design, Slemrod et al. (2001) analyzed 
the results of a randomized controlled experiment conducted by the State of Minnesota Department 
of Revenue (MDOR).  Randomly selected taxpayers who filed a return for tax year 2013 were sent 
a letter from the MDOR in January of 1995. A treatment group was informed that their 1994 federal 
and state income tax returns would be “closely examined” for any irregularities. The effect of this 
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statement on the beliefs of the treatment group depends on their prior beliefs about the probability 
of an audit. If the individual expected that their returns were examined every year then there would 
be no change in behavior. Others may have correctly perceived the letter as increasing the 
probability of an audit. The letter was timed so that individuals generally could only respond by 
changing their reporting behavior. The authors compared the change in income reported by this 
treatment group to that of a control group that did not receive any communication from the MDOR.  
The study found that low- and middle- income taxpayers who received a letter promising a certain 
audit reported slightly more, but statistically significantly more, income than those who did not 
receive such a letter, and the difference was larger for those with greater opportunities to evade in 
the form of income not subject to information reporting. Strikingly, though, high-income taxpayers 
receiving an audit threat on average reported lower income. The authors speculate that 
sophisticated, high-income taxpayers (and their accountants) understand an audit to be a 
negotiation, and view reported taxable income as the opening (low) bid in a negotiation that does 
not necessarily result in the determination and penalization of all noncompliance; this implies that 
the initial lower tax liability report might not indicate that the eventual tax remittance was lower, 
as well. This result provides a caveat that the dynamics of tax evasion for very high-income 
individuals may be different than for others. 
 Kleven et al. (2011) conduct a similar audit experiment in Denmark. In the first year of their 
study, one-half of their sample was randomly chosen to be thoroughly audited (100 percent audit 
group) while the rest were not audited or contacted in any way (0 percent audit group). The 
following year, randomly chosen individuals from both groups received letters announcing either 
a 100 percent probability of audit or a 50 percent probability of audit. A control group received no 
letter. The initial unannounced audit found overall evasion equal to 2.2 percent of net income, but 
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a much higher rate of 14 percent for self-employment income. The audited group was almost 1 
percentage point more likely to report higher net income in the year following the audit. When 
they decompose this effect into the change in reporting by the self-employed versus employees, 
they find that most of the effect is coming from the change in behavior of the self-employed. 
Income that is not subject to third-party reporting is 2.1 percentage points more likely to increase 
following an audit. Third-party reported income on the other hand is only 0.2 percentage points 
more likely to increase if audited in the previous year.  
 The threat-of-audit experiment was conducted only on a sample of employees (i.e., it excluded 
any self-employed individuals) for administrative reasons. The individuals received the letter 
shortly after they received their pre-populated returns, and had one month to make adjustments to 
the return. The baseline probability of an adjustment to net income is 13.3 percent.  Among the 0 
percent audit group, those who received a letter were 1.5 percentage points more likely to make 
an upward adjustment to net income than those who didn’t receive a letter. The effect of the threat 
was similar in the 100 percent audit group, raising the probability of adjustment of net income by 
1.6 percentage points. The paper also tests the effect of different probabilities of audit. Individuals 
who were threatened with a 50 percent probability of audit were about 1.1 percentage points more 
likely to adjust net income upwards than those who received no letter. Those who received the 100 
percent probability of audit were 0.9 percentage points more likely than the 50 percent threat of 
audit to adjust net income upwards.  Thus, although a positive audit probability influenced 
reporting behavior, going from a 50 percent to 100 percent probability had little apparent effect. 
 Doerrenberg and Schmitz (2015) conduct a field experiment in Slovenia that sheds light on the 
effect of audit threats as well as on the mode of communication of this audit threat. In the first 
treatment, a sample of small accounting companies were sent a letter from the tax authority 
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informing them of a 10 percent probability of audit of a return they were due to file. A second 
treatment group received the same letter, delivered to them in person by a “mobile unit” of tax 
officers; a tax officer approached the highest company representative available and read the letter 
to them out loud, and provided no additional information. This second treatment captures the 
influence of personal interaction on the effect of moral persuasion and threat of audit. Compared 
to a control group that received no communication from the tax authority, the increase in reported 
taxable income in the first treatment group was approximately 10 percentage points, while taxable 
income in the second treatment group increased by about 8 percentage points more than in the first 
treatment group. Note, though, that none of the estimated effects is statistically significant, in part 
because the sample consisted of only 142 accounting firms. 
 Some recent research involving randomized controlled trials focuses on the enforcement of 
forms of tax payments other than income tax. Castro and Scartascini (2015) focus on payment 
of a municipal property tax in Argentina.  This municipal property tax differs from an income tax 
in some important ways relevant for enforcement. For one, revenue is directly linked to visible 
provision of public goods like street lights and trash collection, so that taxpayers may be more able 
to directly link their payments to provision of these public goods. Second, payments are calculated 
on the basis of length of the property facing the street, number of street lights and trash collection 
services received at the property. There is little room for misreporting on these measures. The 
authors send three types of letters to test the effect of appeals to fairness, equity, and deterrence. 
They find that the deterrence messages have the strongest effect. Informing taxpayers of the 
penalties of nonpayment increases the probability of remittance by 5 percentage points from a base 
of 40 percent.  These messages also encouraged taxpayers to remit earlier.  
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 In a field experiment in Austria, Fellner et al. (2013) use a randomized design to test the 
effect on compliance with Austrian television and radio licensing fees of various mailings to 
potential noncompliers. Austrian households owning a radio or television are required to remit a 
licensing fee; payment of the annual fee relies on self-reporting and individuals can access public 
broadcasting channels without paying the fee. In 2005, 94 percent of households were registered 
and paid a licensing fee but only 1 percent of households owned neither a TV nor a radio, 
suggesting the presence of evasion. The authors sent letters emphasizing different messages to five 
treatment groups. One publicized the threat of detection and sanction, another was a moral appeal 
equating compliance with fairness, and a third variant provided social information on the overall 
high level of compliance. Two others interacted the threat of detection with the moral appeal 
treatment and with the provision of social information. Those receiving any type of mailing were 
significantly more likely to make a payment within 50 days of receiving the letter, but only the 
variant emphasizing the threat of punishment induced an additional increase in compliance. The 
authors  interpret the generic effect of the mailing as an “alert effect” signaling that nonpayment 
had been noticed, with the consequences of noncompliance amplified by the threat variant. The 
fact that any contact from the tax authority might affect compliance, at least in the short term, is a 
common finding in recent compliance research, consistent, for example, with the results in Kleven 
et al. (2011). 
 Value-added tax (VAT) liability can be lowered by overreporting deductible items or shifting 
costs into categories that are tax deductible. In Chile, diesel tax is fully deductible as a cost if it is 
used in industrial activities but only partially deductible if used for freight or transportation. 
Noncompliant firms evade taxes by purchasing tax-deductible fuel for use in nondeductible 
activities. In 2003, the Chilean tax authority sent a letter to 200 firms with the largest change in 
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fuel tax credits between 2001 and 2002, requesting more information, and then subjected to an 
intensive audit 66 of the 183 firms. Agostini and Martinez (2014) analyze the returns of all firms 
that claimed any fuel tax credit in all months between October 2002 and September 2004. Although 
the firms in the treatment group were not randomly selected, the authors use their knowledge of the 
selection criteria to create a quasi-experimental sample through propensity score matching. On 
average, the firms that received the letter reduced their tax credit claims by 10 percent.  
 Many of the tax compliance RCT treatments involve letters sent by the tax authority. Ortega 
and Scartascini (2015a) investigate another dimension of such interventions, the delivery 
mechanism. They conduct a field experiment in Colombia that varies the way the National Tax 
Agency contacts taxpayers with due payments for income, value added, and wealth taxes (tax 
delinquencies). Taxpayers were randomly assigned to a control, or to one of three possible delivery 
mechanisms: letter, email, and personalized visit by a tax inspector. They find sizable differences 
across delivery methods. Personal visits by a tax inspector are more effective than the impersonal 
methods; they are, alas, also much more expensive. Ortega and Scartascini (2015b) find that the 
effect of phone calls falls between those of the impersonal methods and the personal visits. 
 Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2014) study the behavior of Spanish firms in response to a 
notch in enforcement intensity due to the fact that the Spanish Large Taxpayer’s Unit (LTU) 
monitors firms with revenues above 6 million euros. Even though the compliance requirements and 
tax rates are the same above and below this threshold, enforcement changes discontinuously 
because the LTU has the resources to conduct more audits and to utilize technology to cross-check 
reported information. Revenues, and certainly reported revenues, are subject to firm choice, so that 
in the absence of prohibitive costs to changing firm size, one would expect a hole in the distribution 
of firms that report revenues just above the 6 million euro cutoff. Firms can earn the same pre-
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audit, after-tax income if they remain smaller and escape the intensive monitoring by the LTU. 
Sure enough, there is significant bunching of firms just below the threshold. The bunching is more 
pronounced for intermediate-goods firms, which is consistent with expectations because their 
transactions create more of a paper trail than firms that sell to final consumers and thus the 
discontinuous increase in enforcement intensity affects these firms more than retailers.   
 To combat sales and profit tax evasion by small firms and the self-employed, many developing 
countries have adopted some form of “reverse withholding,” where large firms remit to the tax 
authority a fixed share of their purchases from small firms and these sellers can apply the withheld 
amount as a credit against their self-reported tax liability. This effects a change in the remittance 
regime. While withholding does not affect the firms’ true tax liability, there is typically a 
discontinuity in the audit probability at the withholding rate; firms seeking tax refunds (because 
self-reported tax liability is lower than the withheld amount) are audited at a higher rate than firms 
making additional tax remittances. Examining data from Ecuador, Carrillo et al. (2011) find 
evidence of bunching in reported tax liability just above the 1 percent withholding threshold, 
suggesting firms manipulate their self-reported tax liability and possibly real economic choices to 
minimize tax payments subject to the discontinuity in the audit probability. The pattern of bunching 
changed dramatically in 2007 only for firms subject to a change in the required withholding rate, 
ruling out the possibility that the withholding rate had been chosen to match the distribution of true 
tax liabilities. Third-party data on sales and intermediate input costs filed by large firms as 
withholding agents indicate bunching is indeed associated with tax evasion: self-reported sales are 
smaller than third-party reports for at least 10 percent of firms. 
3.2.2 Specific Deterrence: The Impact of Audits 
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 To this point I have been discussing the impact on compliance of a change in the perceived 
probability of detection of noncompliance, usually referred to as general deterrence.  Another issue 
of interest is the effect of audits on the audited, referred to as specific deterrence.10 A priori 
taxpayers’ behavior following an audit is ambiguous. On the one hand, a taxpayer may assume 
that the probability of getting audited a second time might be low, sometimes referred to as the 
“crater effect,” which would mean that taxpayers are less likely to comply in the years following 
an audit. On the other hand, taxpayers may revise upwards their prior on the probability of an 
audit; these taxpayers would be more likely to comply in the years following an audit. Moreover, 
if taxpayers consider the possibility that past returns will be audited upon detection of current-year 
noncompliance, upon discovery of evasion future noncompliance becomes more attractive.11  
 Two recent studies have examined this issue. DeBacker et al. (2015) use IRS data from the 
National Research Program (NRP) to study the behavior of audited individuals in the years 
following an audit. They construct a control group by randomly selecting (unaudited) returns from 
the same sampling pool as the NRP and who thus have similar characteristics to the audited NRP 
sample. They find that an audit increases reported wage income over three years after the audit by 
0.4 percent and increases Schedule C income by 7.5 percent.  However, this large short-term 
estimated effect on Schedule C income is short-lived; indeed, five or six years following the audit, 
the treated group actually reports lower Schedule C income as compared to the control group. 
When they compare the reporting behavior of the same individual pre- and post-audit, they find 
the same positive effect of an audit.  The external validity of these results is somewhat problematic. 
Because taxpayers audited under the NRP are informed that they have been randomly selected for 
research purposes, these audits may not have the same impact on the perceived probability of a 
future audit as an operational audit. Moreover, these taxpayers are not representative of those who 
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are typically subject to audit, and their behavior may not be representative of those who are 
normally targeted for operational audits.  
 Advani et al. (2015) pursue a similar research strategy using data from the United Kingdom. 
The HM Revenue & Customs conducts a random audit each year similar to the NRP. Instead of 
resampling the subject pool as DeBacker et al. (2015), Advani et al. use individuals who appear in 
the treatment group in future years as the control group for those audited in the current year. For 
instance, individuals who were selected for random audit in 2006 and beyond are used as the 
control group for those audited in 2005. As DeBacker et al., Advani et al. find that those who are 
audited increase their reported tax liability more than the control group in years following the 
audit. Allowing for the lag between when the return is selected for audit and when the audit is 
completed, four years after the audit there is a 26 percent increase in reported liabilities in the 
treatment group compared to the control group.  
3.3.Third-party Information Reporting 
 In Section 3.2 the focus was on understanding the effect of increasing the probability of 
detection via a direct communication (i.e., a letter) from the tax authority to the taxpayer stating 
or implying that this probability has gone up, with the necessary increase in resources to achieve 
this presumed to be forthcoming. Another set of studies makes explicit why the probability has 
gone up. Next I review research where the reason is increased information reporting. 
Field evidence on Chilean firms’ compliance with the VAT highlights the connection between 
information reports received by the tax authority and levels of evasion. Because firms can only 
claim tax credits for inputs bought from tax-compliant suppliers, the invoice-credit VAT system 
has a built-in (albeit imperfect) self-enforcement mechanism. Noncompliant firms purchasing 
inputs would like to overstate purchase costs to inflate tax credits, but sellers have the incentive to 
35 
 
understate sale proceeds to minimize VAT liability. Because these incentives conflict and—except 
for final sales to consumers—information reports are required from both parties to each 
transaction, the VAT is believed to increase the probability of detection of evasion related to 
business-to-business transactions. Pomeranz (forthcoming) tests this hypothesis by mailing 
increased-audit-threat letters to over 100,000 randomly selected Chilean firms, using a sample of 
over 300,000 firms receiving no letter as the control group. Consistent with theoretical predictions 
on the self-enforcement mechanism, the increase in VAT receipts (and therefore the inferred level 
of evasion) induced by the letters is concentrated at the level of sales from firms to final 
consumers, for which there is no paper trail.  
 Carrillo et al. (2014) examine the effect of a change of the tax authority’s use of third-party 
information on reported firm revenues for the corporate tax in Ecuador. The government has a few 
sources to verify firms’ self-reports of revenue, including other firms’ reports of purchases from 
the firm in question, credit-card sales from credit-card companies, as well as exports and imports 
information from the Ecuadorian customs authority. For a few years, the revenue service had 
collected such third-party reports of firm revenues, but had not utilized this information to verify 
firms’ self-reported revenue. In the episode they study, the Ecuadorian tax authority 
(SRI) informed some firms of the discrepancy between the two reports and offered them the 
opportunity to file an amended return. The authors compare the reporting behavior of firms before 
and after notification. They find that 24 percent of firms underreport revenue in years when the 
government did not use the third-party-verified information. They also find no bunching of 
reporting revenue around the third-party reported amount, suggesting that firms did not believe the 
government was using this information. In the three rounds of the experiment, between 11 and 19 
percent of notified firms filed an amended return.  In amended returns, firms correctly report their 
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revenues but they increased their reported costs almost one-for-one with the increase in revenues 
(96 cents for each dollar!). The offset of reported expenses is similar to a finding regarding the 
U.S. 1099-K requiring credit-card companies to report business receipts, discussed below. Thus, 
although reported revenue increased substantially, overall evasion of income tax liability did not 
fall by nearly as much. Because the SRI does not have a comprehensive picture of firms’ costs and 
revenues through third-party information, many firms apparently continued to reduce their tax 
liability through channels not covered by third-party reporting.   The experience of the SRI here 
suggests that the comprehensiveness of third-party information is crucial. In the context of many 
developing countries where such comprehensive information is not available, one might not 
observe a fall in overall evasion from using an additional source of third-party information.  They 
also find that reported costs were lower than third-party information on costs. This finding seems 
to be at odds with a model of firms that seek to only maximize after-tax profits. The authors 
propose that this behavior is consistent with firms who may believe that the probability of an audit 
is a function of firm size and profits. In order to appear small, firms may underreport both revenues 
and costs.   
3.3.1 Involving Charities 
 Two recent papers examine the impact on charitable contributions of altering the information 
reporting system involving charities. Fack and Landais (forthcoming) examine the effect of 
information reporting on claimed charitable contributions by exploiting a change in the French tax 
treatment of charitable donations. Since the early 1970s, charities in France had been required to 
issue standardized receipts to donors but, starting in 1983, the reporting rules began to require 
taxpayers to attach these receipts to their tax filing when they claim deductions. Fack and Landais 
find that reported donations fell by 75 percent after the introduction of this change. The authors 
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argue that this decline resulted from a decrease in overreporting rather than a decline in actual 
donations. Because the new rule only required donors to attach receipts they were already 
receiving, it is plausible that the decline was not due to compliance costs, which were arguably 
quite small. The authors also calculate the net-of-tax price elasticity of contributions before and 
after this increase in enforcement intensity, and find that the estimated elasticity before the 
enforcement change is about three times larger than the estimate after 1983. This is an illustration 
of the endogeneity of the elasticity of (one component of) taxable income to the vector of tax 
policy instruments, as stressed by Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) and investigated empirically by 
Kopczuk (2005): a more effective enforcement regime reduced the tax-price elasticity 
substantially. 
 Gillitzer and Skov (2015) examine the effect of third-party reporting on claims of charitable 
contributions in Denmark. Starting in 2008, charities in Denmark were required to report 
contributions to the tax authority, which would then pre-populate individual tax returns with the 
information; taxpayers could either accept this information or amend it. This reduced compliance 
costs to individual donors, while also increasing the probability that a false claim by an individual 
would be detected.  Gillitzer and Skov find that the number of claims actually increased 
substantially. Apparently, the effect of lower compliance costs far outweighed the effect of 
increased enforcement from third-party reporting, inducing people on average to report some tax-
deductible contributions that they otherwise would not have bothered to claim.  
 At first blush this result might appear to contradict the findings of Fack and Landais 
(forthcoming), who find that requiring receipts from donors greatly reduced claims, but who 
interpreted this as a fall in evasion, arguing that the increased compliance cost implied by the 
requirement of receipts was insubstantial. This assumption seems inconsistent with the Gillitzer 
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and Skov (2015) results. It is possible that the difference in the tax systems of the two countries 
means that overreporting of charitable contributions as a means of tax evasion may not be as 
pervasive in Denmark as in France due to the difference in costs of this channel of evasion. Kleven 
et al. (2011) suggest that this is the case, as only 7 percent of individuals overreport charitable 
contributions compared to the 42 percent evasion rate for self-reported income. A similar audit 
study for France would give us a more accurate idea of the comparability of the culture of evasion 
in the two countries.  
 Also of interest is Kotakorpi and Laamanen (2013), who estimated the effect on the behavior 
of taxpayers utilizing data from a policy experiment in Finland in the 1990s under which a 
proportion of taxpayers received a pre-filled income tax return, whereas other taxpayers had to file 
a full return. They concluded that receiving a pre-filled income tax return led to a significant 
reduction in the number of individuals claiming deductions. Although which return one received 
did not affect the actual chance of evasion being detected, the authors argue that considerations 
related to tax evasion might have been in play if the reform affected individuals’ perceived 
probability of detection: individuals receiving the pre-filled form might have become worried that 
the authorities also had information on other items that were not printed on the form. If this is the 
mechanism behind the results, it would imply that in the new system, some individuals who would 
otherwise have claimed some deductions to which they were not entitled did not do so upon 
receiving a pre-filled return. 
3.3.2 Involving Credit-Card Companies 
 In an effort to reduce understatement of revenues, in 2011, the IRS began to require credit-card 
companies and other third-party payment organizations to report electronic payments received by 
businesses. Analyzing administrative data on the universe of individual income tax returns that 
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report sole proprietor income, Slemrod et al. (2015) find a large increase in the number of 
businesses reporting income that is exactly equal to the amount in the 1099-K report, consistent 
with a simple model of reporting behavior. Although the new reporting requirement increased 
reported receipts of this relatively small group by up to 24 percent, this was offset by a 13 percent 
increase in reported expenses. They also find that at least 20 percent of the group in 2011 were 
induced to file Schedule C by the introduction of Form 1099-K. Thus, information reporting seems 
to have had the intended effect of increasing compliance on the income that is subject to third-
party reports, but the overall effect on evasion was dampened by increased reported expenses, 
which are not directly observable to the tax authority,12 and may also have been offset by firms 
moving to cash receipts that are not covered by this information-reporting regime.  
3.3.3 Involving Consumers and Workers 
 On the grounds of administrative efficiency, modern tax systems have for the most part largely 
excluded people in their role of consumers from tax collection, relying on tax remittance from 
firms even for consumption taxes; neither retail sales tax nor value-added taxes involve consumer 
participation. Modern systems have also de-emphasized the role of people as employees, looking 
to employers via withholding for the bulk of tax collection—and in exact withholding systems for 
all of collection. In general it is more efficient to rely on firms, especially larger firms that can take 
advantage of economies of scale and accounting systems already in place for non-tax reasons, to 
take the lead role in remittance. This system precludes using consumers and workers as a check 
on firm compliance, however, and some recent research explores the possibility of making use of 
such checks. 
 Beginning in 2007, in an effort to reduce VAT evasion by retail firms, the São Paulo tax 
authority provided monetary incentives to customers to report evasion by firms in a program called 
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the Nota Fiscal Paulista (NFP).  Consumers receive tax rebates and are entered into lotteries in 
exchange for requesting receipts, and can also check firms’ reports of their transactions with the 
consumer online and report any discrepancies. Programs with some similar features exist in 
Portugal, Slovakia, Taiwan, China, Puerto Rico, Philippines, and Malaysia.13 Naritomi (2015) 
finds that retail firms increased their reported revenues by 22 percent more than the control group 
of wholesale firms over a four-year period after the introduction of the NFP. Because retail firms 
are directly affected by the NFP and wholesale firms are not, she interprets this as a lower bound 
on the effect of the NFP. On average a firm’s reported receipts go up by 14 percent right after they 
receive their first consumer complaint.  Note that this policy involves changes both to the 
information-reporting and remittance regimes. Consumers are encouraged to utilize what they 
know to check against what firms reported, facilitated by the fact that each retail purchase receipt 
contains the Social Security number of the purchaser.  It also changes the remittance regime by 
providing rebates, some in the form of lottery winnings to consumers.  The modified-VAT 
remittance regime now collects from firms all along the production and distribution chain and 
collects negative revenue from consumers themselves, thus requiring higher remittances by firms 
for a given total revenue collection.  
 Dunning et al (2015 study the effects of a randomized lottery in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 
which the municipal government raffled tax holidays to taxpayers who are current on past 
payments, and also use field and survey experiments in which they inform eligible and ineligible 
taxpayers about the rebate lottery—which has not been effectively advertised by the government. 
They find only weak effects of the government’s program on tax compliance, as well as citizens’ 
attitudes towards taxation and governance. 
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 Kumler et al. (2013) study the effects on evasion of a 1997 pension reform in Mexico that tied 
younger workers’ retirement benefits more closely to their reported wage. This reform provided a 
new incentive for this group of workers to ensure that their employers accurately report their 
wages, which in turn would lower payroll tax evasion by firms.  To examine the impact of this 
initiative, the authors combine two sources of data on wages: administrative data from the Mexican 
Social Security agency (IMSS) and household survey data from the Encuesta Nacional 
de Empleo Urbano (ENEU). Because the ENEU does not link the employee to his firm, the authors 
compare reported wages in the two datasets within cells constructed by firm size and 
sector of the employee’s firm, metropolitan area, and age group. They find that that the gap in 
median or mean wage within a cell between ENEU data and IMSS data falls for younger age 
groups after the pension reform. As predicted, for older workers not affected by this reform there 
is no decrease in the gap between the two income reports.    
3.3.1 Simplified Tax Regimes  
 Many countries offer to smaller firms some form of a minimum alternative tax with an 
otherwise less attractive, but more easily measurable, tax base where the tax regime changes at a 
revenue or profit rate threshold. For example, in Pakistan corporations either pay a tax on profits 
or on turnover depending on which liability is greater. This effectively implies that at a profit rate 
lower than the ratio of the turnover tax rate to the profit tax rate, firms cannot deduct costs. Because 
in Pakistan a large portion of evasion is through misreporting of costs, this tax regime trades off 
loss in production efficiency for a gain in revenue collection efficiency. Best et al. (forthcoming) 
use administrative data on the universe of corporations in Pakistan to estimate the elasticity of 
taxable income using the bunching of firms below the threshold profit rate. They find clear 
evidence of such bunching, whose location shifts along with changes in tax rates that move the 
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threshold. Using the analysis-of-bunching methodology, they estimate that turnover taxes reduce 
evasion by between 60 and 70 percent, but have a small effect on actual production.  
 The introduction of the VAT in Japan in 1989 included an allowance for firms below a 
threshold of 500 million yen in sales to opt for simplified filing. This option translated to a potential 
tax benefit for many firms because it allowed them to claim a fixed portion of their sales (usually 
80 percent) as input costs. Firms whose input costs are below this threshold (i.e. their value added 
is above 20 percent of sales) have an incentive to manipulate their size or structure to be eligible 
for this simplified filing. Firms accomplish this through “tax-motivated splitting”—either 
transferring a portion of their operations to an existing small firm or incorporating a portion of 
their firms as a new firm below the size threshold—or simply misreporting their sales. Onji (2009) 
studies the behavioral response to this system by constructing a counterfactual density of firms 
using a decomposition method by DiNardo et al. (1996) that allows him to separate changes in the 
density due to changes in the distribution of characteristics of firms and due to the introduction of 
the tax benefit threshold. He finds that there is a bunching of firms below the threshold and a 
“missing” mass of firms right above the threshold, implying that Japanese firms did respond to the 
new tax incentive, with evasion being one margin of response.  
3.5 Take-up 
 Although IRS enforcement efforts, and this paper, focus mainly on tax evasion, what limits 
take-up of credits and other tax benefits is also of both policy and intellectual interest. Bhargava 
and Manoli (2015) address the determinants of incomplete take-up with the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) in the United States with a comprehensive randomized field experiment involving 
35,050 eligible individuals. They investigate, using alternative mailings, the role of program 
information (regarding benefits, costs, and rules), informational complexity, and stigma. They find 
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that the take-up rate increases due to the mere receipt of a plain-vanilla mailing, suggesting—
consistent with other studies discussed here—that routine contact from the tax authority can have 
a significant effect on taxpayer behavior, at least in the short run.  In addition, both simplification 
and the visual display of benefits increase take-up. All in all, Bhargava and Manoli suggest that 
the tested interventions could reduce incomplete EITC take-up by about 25 percent.  Notably, 
though, a follow-up study by Manoli and Turner (2014) found little to no long-term increases in 
EITC take-up. Guyton et al. (2015) extend this work to non-filers using an RCT to induce filing 
among non-filers who are eligible to receive credits, even if they owe tax on net. They find similar 
results: there is a concurrent effect, but one that does not persist in future years when the mailed 
reminders stop.  
3.6 Non-Deterrence Policies to Reduce Noncompliance 
 Many of the threat-of-audit letter RCTs discussed so far also contained a non-deterrence 
treatment. Blumenthal et al. (2001) find no evidence that either of two written appeals to taxpayers’ 
consciences had a significant effect on compliance. One letter stressed the beneficial effects of tax-
funded projects, while the other conveyed the message that most taxpayers were compliant. Torgler 
(2004), using a controlled field experiment in Switzerland, also found that moral suasion has hardly 
any effect on taxpayers’ compliance behavior, nor did Fellner et al. (2013). Pomeranz (2015) found 
that a mailing appealing to tax morale, but promising no increased enforcement, had little effect on 
VAT remittances. In Castro and Scartascini (2015), messages that emphasized fairness (taxes are 
used to pay for public services, which the individuals benefits from) or equity (most citizens fulfill 
their tax obligations) do not have a significant effect. Bhargava and Manoli (2015) also find the 
social stigma does not affect take-up of the EITC. In sum, it has been difficult to find evidence that 
appeals to tax morale, defined broadly, affect taxpayer behavior in the short run when delivered via 
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a one-time mailing. As discussed below, part of the reason could be the wording of these appeal-
to-conscience letters; psychological research suggests that using terms wording such as “cheater,” 
as in “Please don’t be a cheater,” might affect behavior more than the standard letter-based appeal 
to conscience wording such as “the entire community suffers.” Whether any government would be 
willing to employ such loaded terms remains to be seen. 
 The failure of such letters to affect compliance on the margin is not inconsistent with the 
existence of a substantial amount of “pathological honesty,” where taxpayers comply against their 
apparent self-interest. Two recent studies shed light on this phenomenon.  LaLumia and Sallee 
(2013) examine panel data of tax returns before and after the United States required that dependent 
exemption claims be accompanied by a Social Security number, which resulted in a fall of about 
seven million dependent exemption claims. They focus on the vast majority of people who 
apparently did not claim a bogus exemption, and conclude that those that did not cheat were less 
likely to be heads of household and more likely to be married filing jointly; surprisingly, cheaters 
and non-cheaters faced similar benefits from falsely claiming a dependent. Dwenger at al. (2014) 
study motivations for tax compliance in the context of a legally binding, but unenforced, local 
church tax in Germany. Based on a randomized field experiment that introduces either positive 
deterrence or the provision of recognition and other non-pecuniary incentives, they find that about 
20 percent of individuals remitted their true taxes owed in the absence of deterrence baseline. 
Recognition through social rewards for compliance caused some people to further increase their 
payments, but the provision of information on social norms or moral appeal had no impact. 
 Recently a few studies have broken the solid set of field-experimental evidence finding no 
effect of such appeals. Bott et al. (2014) reports the results from a randomized field experiment in 
Norway conducted with 18,000 taxpayers who the tax authority deemed were likely to have 
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misreported their foreign income. Shortly after sending the pre-populated tax returns for 2012, the 
tax administration in Norway mailed a letter to these tax subjects with information about how to 
report foreign income that randomly included two types of moral appeal. They find that including 
a moral appeal in this letter almost doubled the average foreign income reported compared to a 
base letter without such an appeal, an effect similar in size to the effect of including a sentence 
that increases the perceived probability of detection. The moral appeals mainly worked on the 
intensive margin, by increasing the amount reported of those who report any foreign income. The 
probability of detection, on the other hand, mainly worked on the extensive margin, by increasing 
the share of tax subjects who report any foreign income. 
 Hallsworth et al. (2014) investigate whether letters that appeal to individuals’ sense of social 
norms and public goods induce individuals to remit their taxes fully and on time. They run two 
large natural field experiments using administrative data from more than 200,000 individuals in 
the United Kingdom, and conclude that including social norms and public goods messages in 
standard tax payment reminder letters can considerably enhance tax compliance. As with other 
randomized studies of enforcement mechanisms, they mail letters to taxpayers that are identical 
save for one sentence.  Six versions of the letter are differentiated by a single sentence that is 
modified to test a specific channel of persuasion. The authors found wording that emphasized that 
the individual was in the minority of non-payers was the most effective in getting individuals to 
remit their taxes. They also find that mentioning financial penalties and remittance plans 
significantly increased the likelihood of compliance.   
 Hallsworth et al. (2014) differ from the earlier studies in some important dimensions. One is 
that Hallsworth et al.’s outcome is the timing of payment of already reported liabilities, while 
most letter-based interventions look at the effect on truthful reporting behavior. It might be that a 
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taxpayer who is simply procrastinating on paying their taxes is more likely to be persuaded by 
social norms than one who is evading taxes.  Second, Hallsworth et al. (like Perez-Truglia and 
Troiano, 2014 discussed below) specifically study taxpayers who missed payment deadlines. 
Finally, there are important differences in how the treatment could have been perceived by the 
recipients. In Hallsworth et al. the letter informs the taxpayer that the U.K. tax authority (HMRS) 
is aware of their delinquency. It says, “Nine out of ten people in the U.K. remit their tax on time. 
You are currently in the very small minority of people who have not paid us yet.” In contrast, for 
example, the letter in the Blumenthal et al. (2001) Minnesota experiment says, “people who file 
tax returns report correctly and pay voluntarily 93% of income taxes they owe […] a small number 
of tax payers who deliberately cheat owe the bulk of unpaid taxes.” In this case, the letter does not 
convey to the taxpayer that the IRS is aware of any wrong-doing by the individual. Thus the 
difference in results could be due to the difference between informing an individual that the 
government has evidence of their actual evasion and appealing to their sense of duty without 
conveying any information on their avoidance behavior.  
 Del Carpio (2013) examines the role of norms and enforcement perceptions on tax compliance 
through a field experiment on property taxes in Peru. Randomly chosen subsets of residents in two 
municipalities in the Lima province were informed, through an official letter from the 
municipality, about the average rate of compliance, the average level of municipal enforcement, 
or both, while a third group was only reminded of the payment deadline. The results suggest that 
simple nudges in the form of one-time letters can have substantial effects. Analysis of the 
administrative data reveals that disclosing information on the level of compliance had a large 
positive impact on compliance (20 percent relative to the control group), while the payment 
reminder also raised compliance by 10 percent. Notably, the enforcement treatment did not have 
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a significant effect on compliance net of the reminder effect, corroborating other evidence that any 
contact from the tax authority to the taxpayer increases compliance, and additional treatments may 
or may not.  
 Besley et al. (2015) develop a theoretical model to investigate the importance of social norms, 
specifically a desire to acquire a pro-social reputation, on tax evasion. They then examine the 
empirical implications of the model in the context of the 1989-1990 poll-tax episode in the United 
Kingdom utilizing a regression discontinuity design based on analyzing shifts in enforcement 
generated by quasi-random (i.e., looking at close elections only) switches in single-party majority 
control of local tax councils. They find persistent effects of the poll-tax shock on post-poll-tax 
evasion behavior. Although the regression discontinuity design facilitates identification of the 
causal effect of the change in party control, it does not separate out the impact of the change in 
party control on tax enforcement from whatever other compliance-relevant policy changes the 
party control brings.  
 This set of results has somewhat moved my pre-2013 prior that the evidence overwhelmingly 
supported that deterrence inhibits noncompliance but that manipulation of norms has no 
measurable effect. In some settings norm-directed letter interventions seem to matter.  It now 
behooves us to understand better why this can work in some settings, but not others. 
 One recent paper investigates the impact of shaming on tax compliance.  Twenty-three U.S. 
states currently try to encourage tax delinquents to remit their tax by publishing their names and 
amount owed online. Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2015) compare the effect of shaming to the effect 
of financial penalties through an experiment where letters sent to delinquents are worded to 
emphasize one or the other. They contact all delinquents with names and addresses published 
online in 3 states: Kentucky, Kansas, and Wisconsin. In theory, individuals will be more likely to 
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pay off their debt if their perceived shaming adversely impacts their social capital, but shaming 
might shift their motivation to pay from an intrinsic to an extrinsic one and therefore decrease the 
likelihood that they remit. The authors find that both shaming and financial penalties increase the 
likelihood of payment within ten weeks of receiving the letter. The effect of shaming varies by the 
size of their initial debt, and matters most for those with small amounts of debt (between $250 and 
$2,273), increasing the likelihood of payment by 2.1 percentage points. The effect declines for 
higher amounts of debt suggesting that there is a limit to the value of preventing social stigma. 
Because tax authorities warn individuals and give them an opportunity to clear their debts before 
publishing their names online, one may consider this effect as a lower bound.  
3.7 Public Disclosure 
Public disclosure 14  of tax information is designed to reduce the attractiveness of tax 
noncompliance as well as aggressive, but arguably legal, tax avoidance. Disclosure may 
complement deterrence by encouraging people with relevant information about others’ true tax 
liability to come forward, and the fear of that and subsequent tax noncompliance penalties (explicit 
and shaming) dampens such behavior. Disclosure may also affect tax reporting because taxpayers 
reduce reported taxable income in order to minimize the attention of the press and of unsavory 
characters wishing to take advantage of their economic situation. On the other hand, some people 
might get satisfaction (bragging rights, if you will) from public appreciation of their level of 
affluence, and may be willing to pay for it in the form of a higher tax liability. The empirical 
evidence on public disclosure in the income tax context is sparse, but growing. Hasegawa et al. 
(2013) study the effect of the Japanese income tax disclosure system that was abolished in 
2004/2005 on tax reports of individuals and businesses. They take advantage of the abolition and 
the fact that disclosure applied only to taxable incomes above 40,000,000 yen (about $400,000). 
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They find strong evidence based on bunching of observations right below the disclosure threshold 
that, on average, individuals and businesses prefer to avoid disclosure; for the latter, this is 
consistent with the local characterization of so-called “39 companies,” whose reported taxable 
income is kept below the disclosure threshold so as not to provide evidence about their 
profitability, which might affect the deals they can make with other companies. However, the 
authors uncover no evidence that disclosure increased reported business taxable income generally. 
 Bø et al. (2015) explore the effect of public disclosure in Norway, which has a long history of 
disclosing tax filings, and beginning in 2001 anyone with access to the Internet could obtain 
individual information on other Norwegians’ taxable income and income tax liability. They exploit 
this change in the degree of exposure to identify the effects of public disclosure on income 
reporting. Identification of the deterrence effects of public disclosure is facilitated by the fact that, 
prior to the shift to the Internet in 2001, in some municipalities something close to the Internet 
type of public disclosure existed because tax information was distributed widely through paper 
catalogues that were locally produced and disseminated. Bo et al. observe income changes that are 
consistent with public disclosure deterring tax evasion: an approximately 3 percent higher average 
increase in reported income is found among business owners living in areas where the switch to 
Internet disclosure represented a relatively large change in access. 
3.8 Understudied Issues 
 It is obvious from the foregoing selective survey that during the last 15 years a lot of exciting 
research on many important topics has been generated. As is natural, there is a flavor of searching 
for one’s lost keys at night under the one working lamppost. We have learned much more about 
the compliance effect of various letter interventions than their relative importance to enforcement 
because tax authorities have been willing to undertake them, in part because they are inexpensive 
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and non-disruptive. On the plus side, for the same reason the research can have a real and fairly 
immediate effect on policy, in contrast to learning about how relatively immutable norms affect 
tax compliance. 
 In what follows I discuss a few topics that I think deserve some more attention in the next 15 
years. One understudied issue is the role of professional tax preparers in tax administration and 
enforcement. OECD (2008) distinguished two kinds: tax advisers and those banks and financial 
institutions that design, promote, and facilitate tax-driven financial instruments and strategies. 
Their role is potentially important given their ubiquity. In the United States, 63 percent of 
individuals and 97 percent of corporations use some professional assistance.  An earlier literature, 
notably Klepper et al. (1991) investigated some aspects of this issue. Countries vary substantially 
in how the tax law and authority relate to professional preparers, from no official contact to 
significant regulation. In the United States, as part of the Professional Preparer Initiative, about 
750,000 tax preparers registered with the IRS by 2011, but no evaluation has been made of 
registration’s impact on tax compliance. More recently, Mahon and Zwick (2015) examine the role 
of paid preparers in the take-up of a tax refund for corporate losses, and endeavor to explain why 
only 37 percent of eligible firms claim their refund. They discover that firms with sophisticated 
preparers, such as licensed accountants, are more likely to claim the refund, such that moving from 
the 10th to 90th percentile in a predicted preparer effect based on observables would increase take-
up by 9.4 percentage points. They reject the possibility that firm selection—savvier firms hire 
savvier accountants—explains the observed preparer effect with a research design based on 
preparer deaths and relocations.  
 I’d also like to see more research on the networks through which information about tax 
enforcement and evasion opportunities spread. The networks might involve families, as in 
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Alstadsӕter et al. (2014)), who use detailed administrative data to identify family networks and 
describe how take-up of tax avoidance progresses within a network. As discussed above, it might 
also involve tax preparers. It might involve the Internet. Hoopes et al. (2015) examine data on 
capital-gains-tax-related information search—on Google, Wikipedia, and IRS information 
services—to determine when and how taxpayers acquire information and find seasonal increases 
in information search around tax deadlines, suggesting that taxpayers seek information to comply 
with tax law. Positive correlations between stock market activity and search as well as year-end 
spikes in information search on capital losses when the market performs poorly suggest that 
taxpayers seek information for tax-planning purposes. Keep in mind also that the policies of public 
disclosure discussed earlier might rely on networks for evasion-restraining whistle-blowing 
behavior. Drago et al. (2015) study the spread of compliance behavior in neighborhood networks 
in the context of a randomized field experiment run in Austria that varied the content of mailings 
sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. They provide survey evidence documenting that the 
communication intensity of neighbors in rural areas is strongly correlated with spatial distance, 
and then document that households who were not part of the experimental sample (and were 
therefore untreated) were more likely to switch from evasion to compliance in response to the 
mailings received by their neighbors in the same network.  Paetzold and Winner (2014) study the 
effect of one’s work environment on the improper claiming of commuter tax allowances in Austria, 
and find an asymmetric effect: once individuals learn from co-workers that over-reporting goes 
undetected, they are more likely to start cheating, but being exposed to an environment of 
compliance does not change previous cheating behavior. 
 Now that there are randomized-experiment results for interventions aimed at compliance and 
collection, it is time to think more carefully about why some interventions work better in one 
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setting than another, and to integrate the two issues in future theoretical models. One aspect of the 
setting is the country. A disproportionate amount of research has been carried out in Nordic 
countries, in part because these countries maintain the most extensive administrative records 
(including linking tax return data to other demographic data).15 But a citizenry that tolerates such 
government monitoring is undoubtedly different from other citizenries in ways that are relevant to 
the questions at hand: the magnitude and nature of noncompliance, the norms that matter, and the 
institutional environment. The setting of much of the recent research discussed here is South 
America.  This is a wonderful development, to be sure, as the issues of compliance and 
enforcement are especially critical in middle- and low-income countries.  But we cannot assume 
that the findings translate to the United States, where the institutions and norms are different.  
 Given the central enforcement role played by withholding, we need to focus more on 
compliance by firm-withholders and other withholding agents. Conventional wisdom maintains 
that this is not a major issue, but little evidence exists in the public domain in support of this 
supposition. I also urge that we take a closer look at the relationship of tax compliance and self-
employment. A mountain of micro evidence, using multiple methodologies, documents a strong 
association between self-employment and noncompliance and between self-employment and the 
“flexibility” of reported taxable income locally to kinks and notches in tax schedules. Kleven 
(2015, p. 82) plots for over 80 countries the fraction of workers who are self-employed against the 
tax/GDP ratio, and documents a strong negative relationship; although he rightly cautions that no 
causal inferences can be drawn from such a graph, I agree with his conclusion that the availability 
of third-party information on employee income plays a key role in tax compliance and in 
explaining a country’s overall tax take.  
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 Theory suggests why this might be so, but in an over-identified way (i.e., there are too many 
theories). Third-party information reporting is not easily done (although see the programs in place 
in other countries discussed in Section 5). Self-employed enterprises are by definition small, and 
the agency argument formalized by Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) and Kleven et al. (2015) suggests 
that evasion is more sustainable. Self-employed people self-select into that status, and may be less 
risk-averse to all forms of uncertainty, including potentially costly detection of evasion. Future 
empirical analysis might aim at sorting out these issues, perhaps by leveraging the fact that some 
people, and some families, have both employee income and self-employment income. The welfare 
implications of this issue are fascinating, because it implies that in the presence of taxes the 
equilibrium distribution of firm borders/size is not optimal, contrary to the suggestion of Coase 
(1937). Taxes can be collected with less cost when the tax authority can make use of information 
generated (and reported) by arms-length transactions between firms and between firms and 
employees. Sole proprietorships and small businesses, especially family firms,16 are difficult for 
the tax authority to penetrate, providing an example of when production efficiency may not be 
desirable when taxes must be raised, contrary to the classic result of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). 
 As the empirical literature on tax compliance and enforcement matures, it is time to better 
connect it with the bread-and-butter normative issues of efficiency and equity. Regarding 
efficiency, the focus on evasion may seem puzzling to those who are steeped in the idea of the 
elasticity of taxable income (or more generally, the elasticity of tax base), which holds that under 
some conditions this elasticity is a sufficient statistic for the marginal welfare cost of changing tax 
rates, and therefore understanding the anatomy of the behavioral response (e.g., labor supply 
versus evasion) is irrelevant. How evasion fits into this framework has been the subject of some 
controversy,17 but in any event knowing how evasion contributes to the behavioral response helps 
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focus policy discussions; in the extreme, if we were to discover that there is no evasion under any 
circumstances, pondering optimal enforcement would be a waste of time.  
 Integrating compliance and enforcement into optimal tax will require attention to one of the 
most difficult empirical issues, the effect of evasion and enforcement on real decisions such as 
labor supply. Sometimes in policy debates this is ignored, when supporters imply that cracking 
down on evasion can raise revenue while avoiding the real behavioral responses we associate with 
raising tax rates. But this argument is logically flawed. Increased enforcement of, say, income 
taxes raises the expected tax rate (only for prospective evaders), and will trigger similar real 
responses as an explicit tax rate increase. For sure many of the empirical papers discussed here 
investigate both real and compliance responses, but they generally do not focus on this interaction. 
This is a particular challenge in the case of labor supply, because most of the administrative data 
sets naturally contain information on reported taxable income, but do not match it with data on 
labor supply, although in some cases data on job flows exist. In the same vein, we need to know 
more about the substitutability between evasion and (legal) avoidance: if an enforcement policy 
cracks down on evasion, to what extent will people respond by increasing (untaxed or lightly taxed) 
avoidance behavior?  
 Paying attention to the distributional implications of compliance and enforcement policies is 
another logical extension of the recent wave of empirical analysis. Johns and Slemrod (2010), 
assess the distributional consequences of income tax noncompliance in the U.S. federal income 
tax for the tax year 2001 using NRP data, and Matsaganis and Flevotomou (2010) address this 
question for pre-crisis Greece. Of particular interest is understanding the scope and nature of tax 
evasion by the highest income groups and its susceptibility to enforcement initiatives such as the 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), especially given the burgeoning attention to the 
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level and growth of income and wealth concentration in the United States and other countries. Of 
note is Zucman (2014), which relies on the anomalies in global investment statistics caused by 
offshore fortunes (i.e., more liabilities than assets show up in global investment data) to estimate 
that U.S. residents own and evade taxes on about $1.2 trillion abroad, equal to about 4 percent of 
their financial wealth, resulting in an annual revenue loss of $36 billion. 
 A complete analysis of incidence must address the general equilibrium incidence of tax 
evasion. An early literature (e.g., Kesselman, 1989, and Martinez-Vazquez, 1996) discuss the 
theory, but this theory has not been updated to a tax-systems framework, nor pursued much 
empirically. 18  One recent exception is Kopczuk et al. (forthcoming), who present empirical 
evidence that the identity of the remitting party in the U.S. diesel fuel market affects both 
collections and the incidence of taxes. Retail diesel prices are higher, and diesel taxes are passed 
through to retail prices to a greater extent, in states where the point of collection is at the distributor 
or prime supplier level rather than at the retail level, suggesting that this collection regime reduces 
evasion.  
4. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
 Increased enforcement is just one way to raise revenue, with the obvious alternatives being to 
raise tax rates or broaden the tax base.  In formulating optimal policy one needs to consider the 
marginal costs of enforcement relative to the costs of alternative ways to raise revenue. Thus, the 
overall objective of this aspect of tax policy is not different than the objective of choosing tax rates, 
bases, and other elements of a tax system. The costs of increased enforcement include 
administrative costs (that show up in the IRS budget), compliance costs (that don’t show up in the 
IRS budget), excess burden (due to behavioral response), and the extra uncertainty to taxpayers 
that the “tax lottery” creates.  
56 
 
 Consideration of the social costs of tax evasion highlights the difference between the 
“recoverable” portion of the tax gap and the “economically recoverable” portion, borrowing 
language usually applied to oil reserves.  The optimal tax gap is not zero any more than it is 
appropriate to extract all the oil beneath the ground, or to put a police officer at every corner to 
eliminate all street crime. For this reason ascertaining the size of the tax gap may not be that helpful 
for policy.  Small noncompliance rates do not necessarily indicate that there are no worthwhile 
policy initiatives aimed at noncompliance, nor do high noncompliance rates automatically mean 
that there are necessarily worthwhile enforcement initiatives.  If the gap related to some activity is 
zero, there may be over-enforcement. 
 Two separate policy issues arise: (1) how big should the IRS enforcement budget be, and (2) 
how best to allocate a given budget.  For the former, pushing the budget until the marginal revenue 
obtained equals the cost of obtaining is not the right rule, because it ignores that the revenue 
collected has value to taxpayers.  The social benefits of more enforcement should be compared to 
its social costs. For the allocation question, a useful rule of thumb is that all tax policies should 
equalize the marginal efficiency cost of funds, a simple expression that accounts for all the costs 
of raising revenue.19  
 In what follows I summarize what I conclude about policy from the recent academic literature 
and observations about policies in place in other countries, plus the unquantifiable value judgments 
that all policy pronouncements unavoidably involve and the unquantifiable non-pecuniary values, 
such as privacy and intrusiveness that come into play under some enforcement strategies.  
4.1 Increase the IRS Budget 
 I can’t prove it’s optimal, but I believe the IRS budget should be increased. If the budget was 
anywhere close to optimal in 2010, it must be too small now.  Since then the budget has declined 
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by more than 10 percent, while the responsibilities of the IRS have expanded, due to the Affordable 
Care Act, the FATCA, and other new initiatives. To cope with the budget cuts, the IRS has had to 
reduce their workforce by 12.3 percent in the last year. This smaller workforce is also less prepared 
because the training budget is 83 percent lower than what it was in 2010. 20 A recent report by the 
U.S. National Taxpayer Advocate describes the decline in the quality of service to taxpayers due 
to the IRS budget cuts. It notes that taxpayers had to wait on hold for an average of 23 minutes, 
and when they did get through could only get an answer to a more limited set of questions. Any 
questions that required expertise were newly considered “out of scope” and would not be 
answered; after the filing deadline, the IRS would not answer any tax law questions.  For the 2015 
fiscal year, the IRS projects that it will only be able to answer 50 percent of the 100 million calls 
they expect to receive with wait times exceeding 30 minutes. My sense is that the horizontal equity, 
vertical equity, and efficiency of the tax system would be improved if the IRS had more resources. 
4.2 Focus on Deterrence  
 What should the IRS do with the money it is appropriated? The recent evidence has 
strengthened my belief that deterrence remains the most crucial policy instrument in addressing 
noncompliance, and thus attention must focus on one of its two crucial parameters: the probability 
that evasion will be detected and punished.21 
 By saying this I do not intend to dismiss the importance of the non-deterrence aspects of tax 
administration. IRS agents should treat taxpayers with respect and civility. The IRS should provide 
taxpayers with education through its website, phone services, and outreach, and should provide 
taxpayers with information about what purposes tax revenues are used.  A few TV commercials 
running at 3:00 a.m. appealing to norms wouldn’t hurt. In the United Kingdom, an evaluation of 
advertising campaigns by HMRC indicated that 8,300 additional taxpayers had been induced to 
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register in the tax system, remitting £38 million over three years, providing a return of 19-to-1 for 
the expenditure of £2 million.22 I doubt, though, that a tax authority can do much at the margin to 
enhance such potentially important factors such as the legitimacy of government. The recent 
literature, with recent exceptions noted earlier, does not find compelling evidence that sending 
letters emphasizing the duty to be tax-compliant or stressing the civic duty aspects affects tax 
compliance. What provides the biggest deterrence bang per buck?  
4.3 Expanded Information Reporting 
 The United States is probably not ready, on intrusiveness grounds, to involve consumers in the 
tax enforcement process the way that São Paulo in Brazil has done, or to reintroduce23 public 
disclosure of income tax information, although the evidence suggests that each of these measures 
did, in other countries, have at least modest pro-compliance effects. The margin of standard 
information reporting is certainly at issue, though. The 1099-K initiative regarding credit-card 
receipts apparently increased compliance of a small segment of sole proprietors, but its 
effectiveness was reduced by its lack of coverage of expenses or of cash receipts.  
 The FATCA initiative takes information reporting to another level, by requiring/inducing 
foreign financial institutions to report to the IRS, directly or through their home government, about 
the foreign accounts of U.S. citizens. Much anecdotal evidence suggests that the compliance costs 
of this effort (mostly borne initially by foreign institutions) are substantial, so (at least from a 
global perspective) the hurdle should be high for its compliance impact. However, because the 
effects on noncompliance apply mostly to high-income households, the dollar-against-dollar 
hurdle is somewhat lower than otherwise. Because much of the world has committed to implement 
something similar to FATCA, called the Common Reporting System (CRS), by 2016, it behooves 
the IRS to carefully analyze the early results of the FATCA initiative.24 
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4.4 Better DIF Scores 
 One of the methods the IRS uses to select returns for examination is computer scoring.  The 
Discriminant Function System (DIF) provides numeric scores for each return that rates the 
potential for change in tax liability upon audit, based on past IRS experience with similar 
returns. The Unreported Income DIF (UIDIF) score rates the return for the potential of unreported 
income. This score is a principal criterion, supplemented by many “compliance filters,” used by 
IRS personnel to select returns for audit and identifying the items on these returns that are most 
likely to need review. The IRS puts considerable effort into getting the right formula.  
 Because the DIF and UIDIF are tightly guarded secrets (but see just below), I have no standing 
to say that the IRS could do better.  But I do have a suggestion and a question.  The suggestion is 
that the IRS make available to academics and private firms (on a controlled basis, of course) a 
large sample of anonymized returns as filed and as “corrected” by auditors, indicate a menu of 
possible objective functions (e.g., maximize dollars of noncompliance discovered, number of 
noncompliant returns discovered, number of noncompliant returns with the amount above a certain 
threshold discovered), and let them submit a new discriminant formula (NDIF). The IRS would 
then evaluate these NDIFs on a separate large sample of tax returns as filed and as amended by 
audit. The reward for discovering a better NDIF is to be specified. I suggest that this would, at 
relatively small cost, lead us to a better DIF.25 There is substantial precedent for such a venture, 
the most famous being the Netflix Prize, a $1 million prize offered (and awarded in 2009) by 
Netflix to the algorithm that provided the most accurate predictions about how much someone is 
going to enjoy a movie based on their movie preferences. The idea of an open competition for 
predictive modelling is now institutionalized in the form of kaggle.com, which provides a platform 
for several such competitions, recently including predicting who survived the Titanic sinking.26 
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 My question is why the DIF needs to be such a closely guarded secret.  I understand that public 
knowledge of the formula would facilitate people gaming the probabilities (by, say, reporting less 
charitable deductions than otherwise), but this (if some claimed deductions are of dubious validity) 
may be exactly the behavior that is socially optimal.  But, under the current system, savvy potential 
evaders make a guess about the DIF (and other audit triggers), and game their reports accordingly.  
It is not obvious (to me, at least) that complete secrecy is always the best strategy, and I know of 
no formal proof of this. 27 
4.5 Getting the Money 
 Although public finance textbooks pooh-pooh its importance, the remittance system can be of 
first-order importance in efficiently enforcing and administering a tax system. Getting the money 
from what Logue and Slemrod (2009) call the “low-cost remitters” matters. This lesson has been 
recognized most clearly in the system of employer withholding most countries use for income and 
payroll taxes: it is cheaper to deal with collecting the tax liability from a small number of 
organizations with relatively efficient bookkeeping done for non-tax reasons. As mentioned 
earlier, we now have evidence from diesel taxes that shifting the remittance responsibility can 
affect the volume of tax evasion.28 
 Note that some of the information-reporting initiatives discussed in this paper also shift the 
remittance pattern. The São Paulo system of involving final consumers in the VAT offers rewards 
to those who participate; in essence, the value of the corroborative information comes with a 
negative remittance from consumers, which must ultimately be offset by larger remittance 
elsewhere in the VAT chain, in other taxes, or lower expenditures. The dual landlord-tenant 
remittance system of the Italian TASI spreads the remittance responsibility and thereby generates 
corroborative information. A primary tax difference between classifying, say, Uber drivers as 
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employees or as independent contractors is that only in the former case would Uber be responsible 
for withholding (i.e., remitting) an approximation of the income tax liability the driving produces. 
Recently, Airbnb, Inc. has entered into agreements with certain cities that it would remit the hotel 
tax liability, rather than the property hosts themselves. 29  The policy message is that, for tax 
compliance reasons, the borders between efficient and inefficient remittance responsibility need 
to be defended. 
 Another aspect of getting the money is collection of undisputed taxpayer debts to the tax 
authority. After all, the deterrence model focuses on the perceived probability that an evading 
taxpayer will be penalized, which includes ultimately having to pay up. The field experiments 
recently done suggest that frequent contact, shaming, and face-to-face contact can accelerate 
payments. The IRS is to be commended for its participation in field experiments to help determine 
optimal collection strategy. This is an area where more creative efforts might be rewarded; for 
example, several states publish the names of the biggest debtors, and believe it helps with 
payments.  
 A natural set of payments for which to ponder expansion of withholding are those already 
subject to information reporting. Of the 34 OECD countries, 8 now have withholding against 
broker transactions, 23 for dividends, 26 for interest income, and 4 for proceeds from real estate 
transactions.30 
4.6 Informal Economy 
 A nontrivial fraction of tax evasion in the United States is tied to the informal economy, 
although that fraction is probably lower than in most other countries. Because other countries have 
a bigger informal economy problem than the United States (and have different standards about 
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permissible government intrusion), some enforcement strategies have been tried elsewhere 
already.  
 As of 2012, it is illegal in Norway to purchase cleaning services from companies not approved 
by the labor inspectorate. In many European countries (e.g., Sweden, Poland, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Greece, Italy, and Hungary) certified cash registers have been used. Since 2010 in 
Sweden, businesses selling for cash (including debit cards) must have a certified cash register that 
includes a special black box that only can be accessed by the tax authority; this is in part to counter 
the use of zappers, software installed on electronic cash registers or other electronic point of sales 
that allows users to erase recorded transactions.31 Since 2008 in Sweden, for home renovation and 
domestic services consumers can apply for a scheme where they pay the supplier for materials but 
only half of the labor portion of the fee. The company performing the work then applies to the tax 
authority for the other half, thus revealing to the tax authority their existence and some of their 
taxable income and VAT base. Denmark since 2011 has a regime where consumers can deduct 15 
percent of the costs of home maintenance and services if a report of the expenses are sent digitally 
to the tax authority, in part designed to make declared domestic services cheaper than their 
informal economy counterparts.32 
4.7 Discouraging Cash and Encouraging Engagement with the Financial Sector 
 Some types of tax evasion are facilitated by transacting in cash.  In response, many 
governments have introduced a ceiling for cash transactions—DKK 10,000 in Denmark, €1,000 
in France and Italy, €5,000 in Belgium, and €1,500 in Greece. 33  Others have required POS 
terminals in, for example, taxis. Although it has been suggested that cash be directly taxed, this 
has not been widely implemented.34 There was a tax on cash withdrawals in India from 2005 to 
2009, designed primarily as an audit trigger. 35   Alternatively, one could consider providing 
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incentives to use cards. Argentina offers a 5 percent VAT discount on debit-card transactions and 
a 3 percent discount on credit-card purchases. South Korea offers a lump-sum refund if card usage 
exceeds 20 percent of individual gross income for credit cards and 25 percent for debit cards.36 
Either a tax on cash or a subsidy to the use of electronic payment could be justified as a Pigouvian 
policy to address the marginal social cost of difficult-to-monitor-for-tax-purposes transactions. 
Note that the United States has recently gone in the opposite direction, due to the District Court 
ruling that allowed stores to charge purchasers a surcharge of up to 4 percent for using a credit 
card.37  
 It is, however, wrong to think that electronization of payments always facilitates tax 
enforcement. A case in point is electronic cash and cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin. According 
to its press clippings, cryptocurrency is about privacy and resistance to oversight, but it also 
becomes difficult to enforce certain taxation and financial regulations when online transactions 
cannot be tracked.38  The 1099-K initiative discussed earlier also has this disadvantage, cracking 
down on underreporting of credit-card sales while leaving cash sales untouched. 
 Under one of the two plans discussed in the report of the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal 
Tax Reform (2005, p. 128), small- and medium-sized businesses would have to use designated 
business bank accounts into which they would deposit all receipts and from which they would 
make business expenditures. Businesses would be prohibited from making personal expenditures 
out of, or from commingling personal and business funds in, these segregated business bank 
accounts. To improve compliance, banks would be required to provide small businesses with an 
annual summary of account inflows and outflows that would be reported directly to the IRS by the 
financial institution maintaining the account. Needless to say, this was not adopted, and probably 
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wisely because of its substantial intrusion into the financial affairs of firm owners. Its other 
compliance suggestion was adopted, the Form 1099-K discussed earlier. 
4.8 Process 
 The IRS is now fully on board with electronic filing, as a way to process returns at lower cost. 
About 65 percent of all returns processed by the IRS in 2014 were filed electronically. It could do 
more. Two options stand out. The first is the system known alternatively as pre-filled or pre-
populated returns, already used to some extent in at least 26 countries, and piloted in California. It 
provides, at no cost to taxpayers upon filing, the information the government already has access to 
through information returns. It has been attacked as an unwarranted intrusion into the private tax 
preparation software business; on these arguments, see Holtzblatt (2007) and Bankman (2008). 
Indirectly it would help compliance if it freed up IRS resources to devote to enforcement, and if it 
provided taxpayers with a warm glow that ignited their intrinsic motivation to comply (don’t hold 
your breath on that).  As discussed earlier, the direct effect of pre-population on compliance is 
unclear, but saving in collection costs is almost certain.  
 Another option, discussed by Bankman (2008) and Ventry (2011), would involve a centralized 
database maintained by the federal government containing most of the information required to file 
a tax return such as wages information, common deductions, and taxes paid. Taxpayers, 
professional preparers, and authorities could all access this shared source of information to file 
taxes. Some filers would still need to input information like charitable deductions. For most 
taxpayers, however, the “data retrieval system” would considerably simplify the process because 
they would no longer have to gather the information required from disparate sources. The United 
Kingdom has taken a leading role in implementing similar online accounts. For example, about 5 
million small- and medium-sized businesses are slated to manage their tax affairs through a 
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personalized homepage, allowing them to register, file, and remit what they owe for several taxes 
and see their liabilities for these taxes. 
 The IRS could also take advantage of improved information technology by offering a “smart” 
tax return.  Bankman et al. (forthcoming) discuss three ways that a smart return could improve 
compliance. The first involves changing the wording on existing returns to increase the 
psychological cost of evasion and increase the perceived expectation of detection by, for example, 
placing the attestation of honesty to the top of the form. The second builds appeals to morality in 
the return itself through the use of a short phrase containing a "self-relevant" noun, such as 
“cheater,” as in “please don’t be a cheater.” Research suggests that this approach might affect 
behavior more than the standard letter-based appeal to conscience wording such as “the entire 
community suffers” from evasion or referring to the “compliant majority.” The third uses online 
"conversational agents" to ask adaptive questions that incorporate information known about the 
taxpayer, including information from answers to previous questions. This would allow the IRS to 
ask more focused questions, which should reduce evasion and audit costs and it could also benefit 
taxpayers by reducing filing time and eliminating the risk of subsequent audit. Adaptive 
questioning that is part of a data-driven system allows for continuous experimentation and real-
time modification of algorithms to incorporate the results of that experimentation. 
5. An Excerpt from the State of the Union Address of 201739 
 “My tax system proposals do not end with bringing the income tax rate structure in line with 
our values and eliminating unfair and inefficient loopholes. The fairness of the tax system and its 
impact on economic growth also depend on how well the laws are enforced. Whatever the top tax 
rate is, it does not contribute to progressivity if high-income people park their money in foreign 
66 
 
financial accounts and don’t report the income, and it does not help the economy if investment is 
diverted from Main Street USA.” 
 “Law-abiding Americans should not have to pay the bills left unopened and unpaid by those 
who do not play by the rules.  That goes for most owners of small businesses, whose contribution 
to the U.S. economy is so important. The thousands of honest housepainters should not have to 
struggle to compete with others who shirk their tax obligations and can thereby underprice the 
honest service providers. Complying with the tax laws is an obligation of all citizens.” 
 “The government has an obligation, as well, to make the tax system as simple and efficient as 
possible while fairly enforcing the laws. Here are some concrete steps we will take. First, the IRS 
will be allocated a budget that allows it to do its job well, and continue to do it while respecting 
taxpayers and providing them with the information they need to comply. Modern data analysis 
techniques will be employed to identify honest taxpayers and leave them be, while bringing to 
justice those who are not honest. American taxpayers will also benefit by a modernization of the 
tax-filing process that will save time and money, and will have the opportunity to go to a highly 
secure, password-protected website that contains the information the government already has; for 
most, tax filing will require just a click of a button to prepare as well as file their return.” 
 (Standing ovation from both sides of the aisle.) 
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1 On this issue, see Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), who examine the stock-market response to 
publicized tax aggressiveness to sort out empirically these two concerns of public corporations, 
finding that on average stock prices decline when news about involvement in tax shelters 
becomes public. Stock price falls tend to be larger for retail-sector firms, which may be due to a 
possible consumer/taxpayer backlash.  
2 The NRP replaced a similar program known as the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement 
Program in 2001. 
3 See Mazur and Plumley (2007). 
4 A notable exception is the United Kingdom, where the HMRC has calculated tax gap estimates 
for many British taxes; they use bottom-up estimates based on random audits for several aspects 
of noncompliance for individual income tax, business tax for small- and medium-sized enterprises.  
See HMRC (2015) and IMF (2013). 
5 See Kleven and Waseem (2013). 
6 Of note is the fact that the IRS’ 2014-2017 strategic plan states a target voluntary compliance 
rate of 87 percent by 2017 (IRS, 2014). 
7 As a comparison, the HM Revenue & Customs (2015) recently calculated the overall tax gap in 
the United Kingdom as of 2013-2014 to be 6.4 percent of true liability: 5.0 percent for the 
individual income tax, 6.4 percent for the corporation tax, and 11.1 percent for the value-added 
tax. Small and medium-sized enterprises account for over half of the overall tax gap. 
8 Tax evasion estimates for other countries using this method include Schuetze (2002) for 
Canada, Johansson (2005) for Finland, Engström and Holmlund (2009) and Engström and Hagen 
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(2015) for Sweden, Martinez-Lopez (2013) for Spain, Paulus (2015) for Estonia, and Hurst et al. 
(2014) for the United States. 
9 Hallsworth (2014) reviews several recent RCTs addressed to tax compliance. 
10 It might be useful to define an intermediate concept of deterrence, which includes the impact 
on those taxpayers who learn of specific enforcement actions directed to others, and possibly 
thereby modify their behavior. The links may be by word-of-mouth via taxpayers through 
various networks, including tax preparers. Let me tentatively propose “network deterrence.” See 
Section 3.8 for more discussion of networks. 
11 Engel and Hines (1999) draw out the implications of this dynamic aspect of decision-making. 
12 Note, though, that in an audit the burden of proof for expenses rests on the taxpayer, while it 
rests on the IRS for receipts. 
13 See Marchese (2009). 
14 Public disclosure also refers to opportunities offered to previously noncompliant taxpayers to 
correct their tax affairs under specified terms that typically do not waive tax liability (in contrast 
to amnesty programs). Whether public disclosure is an aspect of deterrence or an example of the 
potential impact of non-deterrent interventions is not clear. 
15 The Nordic countries also have a disproportionate number of excellent public finance 
economists. 
16 Kopczuk and Slemrod (2010) provide a sketch of how to model the taxation of family firms, 
stressing that in some developing countries the weakness of legal institutions encourages the 
formation of family firms, whose family bonds informally enforce against theft; these bonds 
have a social cost because they increase the opacity of firms, making tax enforcement more 
difficult. 
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17 Compare Chetty (2009) with Gillitzer and Slemrod (2014). 
18 A recent exception is Nygård et al. (2015).  
19 Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996) discuss the appropriate formula and its application to tax-system 
policy. 
20 OECD (2015, p. 173). Not that this makes it right or wrong, but tax agencies in many countries 
have also been facing cuts. For example, staffing at the U.K. tax authority, the HMRC, fell from 
91,167 in 2005 to 61,370 in 2014. 
21 The severity of punishment is the other crucial parameter, but little empirical research has been 
devoted to this topic. Blank (2014) and Paramonova (2015a, b) discuss “collateral tax sanctions” 
such as revoking from tax evaders drivers’ licenses, professional licenses, and passports. 
22 See Williams (2014, p. 185) and National Audit Office (2008). 
23 The United States had public disclosure of income tax returns in its Civil War income tax, and 
again in 1923 and 1924. 
24 For full disclosure I must reveal that this sentence is highly self-serving as I, with Niels 
Johannesen and Daniel Reck, am currently working with the Research, Analysis, and Statistics 
Division of the IRS to do just this. 
25 A team of computer scientists claims that artificial intelligence techniques can ascertain 
whether a corporation has used a particular sophisticated tax shelter.  See Browning (2015). 
26 See also the survey on forensic economics by Zitzewitz (2012). 
27 Reinganum and Wilde (1988) comes closest. 
28 Kopczuk et al. (forthcoming). 
29 Wilking (2015) examines the impact of these agreements on the prices of Airbnb properties. 
30 OECD (2015). 
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31 These policies are discussed in greater detail in Williams (2014, pp. 101-103). Zappers and 
appropriate policy responses are discussed by Ainsworth (e.g., 2010). 
32 Williams (2014, p. 160). 
33 See Williams (2014, p. 103). 
34 See Benshalom (2012). Macroeconomists are also interested in this notion as a way to 
facilitate a negative interest rate; see, for example, the discussion in Rogoff (2014) regarding the 
costs and benefits of phasing out paper currency. 
35 See Tax Administration Reform Commission (2014). 
36 See Williams (2014, p. 104). 
37 Note that most credit cards now offer purchasers rewards related to usage. These rewards 
programs offset to some degree any surcharge for credit-card use, and it is notable that the 
reward percentage is often higher for purchases at gas stations, where cash discounts abound. In-
kind rewards for cash payments extend to Ann Arbor, MI, where my favorite take-out Chinese 
restaurant offers a free eggroll with a cash payment and, most recently, exempts the cash-paying 
customer from a 49-cent “convenience charge.” 
38 See Marian (2013). 
39 In recent decades, newly inaugurated presidents have chosen to deliver speeches to joint 
sessions of Congress but have not officially considered them State of the Union addresses. 
